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ON THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF DODDRIDGE'S SEMINARY.

To the Editor of the Christian Disciple.

SIR,

PERHAPS no name can be mentioned among Christian divines, at once so familiar and so dear to the friends of religion without distinction, as that of Doddridge. Most of us, therefore, would be very unwilling "to give up to party" one who belongs to the great cause of piety and charity throughout Christendom; and it is sufficiently well known, that justice to his character would forbid such a sacrifice, not less than regard to the interests of catholicism. To this sort of usurpation however, the most popular names are very naturally the most liable; and it is melancholy to think that he, whose candid and enlarged mind has secured to him the united love and respect of his fellow-christians, is the more eagerly claimed on this very account, by the zealots of a sect; especially, if any point of agreement in doctrine can be found between them. He is, when his own voice can be no longer heard, made an associate in the spirit and the acts of an exclusive party. We shall seek in vain, for a man whose name has been more continually thus abused, than that of the pious and liberal Doddridge. It is not easy without a smile to meet his name, regularly on the cover of our religious journals in the company of some, from whom (it may be said without hazard, I think) had he been a living cotemporary, he would have kept more widely removed; and he would, perhaps, on the same supposition, have had as little fellowship with those whose

names might be subscribed to many of the pages within, notwithstanding this pretended sanction of his own.

Of this sectarian appropriation of the name of Doddridge, I have lately met with an instance in a discourse delivered, Oct. 1818, by the Rev. Dr. Porter, "at the Dedication of a new edifice for the use of the Seminary in Andover;" and I believe you will agree with me, that the very incorrect impression it is calculated to give, ought not to pass unexposed. The passage to which I refer, is found in a most remarkable paragraph, full of fearful forebodings, (in which the author is probably aware that he is not at all singular,) as to the future character of the institution with which he is connected. Neither "the strength of our own powers," nor "the elevated motives of our founders," nor "the safeguards of our constitution," he observes, afford any ground of reliance on its undeviating adherence to the purity of the faith. "Where are *other* seminaries," he adds, "which wisdom encompassed with its precautions, and piety consecrated to Christ and the church? Have we forgotten—can we forget the awful lesson furnished to mankind by the school of Doddridge?"

The language of Dr. Porter would lead to the inference, that the character of the school of Doddridge was in the lapse of time revolutionized, and the chair of this pious divine occupied at last by unworthy successors. His hearers and readers may not in general be very minutely acquainted with the history of this seminary; and perhaps, therefore, would receive this statement without suspicion or doubt. To attribute as little acquaintance with it to Dr. Porter, would probably be unjust, certainly uncomplimentary; and to his inconsideration therefore, I must ascribe a reference, which is not merely nothing to his purpose, but, what is more, will be easily shown to have been a most unfortunate example.

It is now more than a century since Wm. Coward, Esq. an eminent merchant of London, bequeathed his large property to pious purposes. In his views of Christianity, he was a decided Calvinist; but it does not appear that his mind was so bigoted to a system as to restrict his wealth to its exclusive support. Certain it is, that the terms of his will left his trustees at full liberty to devote this property to the cause of education among the youth of Protestant dissenters indiscriminately. These trustees consisted of three dissenting ministers and one layman. For many years two respectable and flourishing institutions, having the above object, were supported by this fund; one, in the vicinity of London, successively under the care of Dr. Jennings, Dr. Savage, Dr. Kippis, and Dr. Rees. This list, one would think, was a sufficient an-

swer to the supposition that this fund was at any period made subservient to the promotion of a peculiar system. The other seminary was at first established at Northampton, under the care of Dr. Doddridge. It was afterwards removed to Daventry, under Dr. Caleb Ashworth, and in 1785, the trustees, deeming the fund inadequate to the support of two institutions, united the first mentioned with that at Daventry, under the Rev. Thomas Belsham. They who are apt to be deceived by names, will startle probably at Mr. Belsham's, and imagine Dr. Porter's language to have been abundantly justified. Let it be understood, then, that this now well known divine was, at the time of his appointment, of that class of believers commonly called evangelical dissenters; and the circumstances of his resignation are both so interesting, and so accordant with my purpose in these remarks, that the relation of them, I trust, will not be to trespass on the patience of your readers.

During the period of Mr. Belsham's connexion with this academy, the Unitarian controversy, occasioned by the writings of Lindsey and Priestley, was vehemently agitated in England. To this controversy, the Principal deemed it his duty to direct the attention of his pupils. For their benefit and his own, he prepared, after the manner of Dr. Clarke, a classification of all the texts referring to this great question, and supposed to favour either of the prevailing modes of faith, certainly omitting none, to which the advocates of the highest notions of our Saviour's nature are fond of appealing. He had the most undoubting confidence, that the controversy would soon be decided by the complete discomfiture of the new heresiarchs. But the result was far other than his expectations; for the young minds of his pupils, yet unfettered to a system, were more open to conviction, and many of them at length adopted those opinions they were expected to subvert, much to the grief of their friends, and not least to that of their instructor. His own habits of thinking were more firmly rivetted; and though, from the first of the inquiry, he was surprised to find so few unequivocal proofs of his favourite opinions, yet such was the ascendancy which the associations of education had obtained over his mind, that he does not believe it would have been in the power of argument to have subdued it, had not the nature of his office, which required him to repeat his lectures to successive classes, compelled his attention again and again to the subject. His original prepossessions became thus almost imperceptibly overruled, and he was brought over to a faith, against which his present interest as well as previous opinions alike revolted. Such, however, is the feeling with which the mind watches its vacillations in an inquiry of this high moment, when it is most anx-

ious to form a correct decision, when almost every thing rests on that decision, and when it is most unwilling to suspect as error what it has long venerated as truth, that he could at last be convinced of the entire revolution of his views and sentiments, only by the distressing embarrassment occasioned him by the repetition in public of a sermon composed a few years previously, in which the doctrines he had just been examining were assumed as truths. Then it was that he felt it incumbent to resign his charge into the hands by which it had been conferred. To this measure, the peculiar conscientiousness of his own feelings impelled him; for the constitution of the seminary did not necessarily require his separation from it. But however compatible his present views were with the constitution, they were not probably with those of the then governors of the academy; and it was sufficient to determine a mind so open and honest, that the New Testament did not now present to him the same aspect, as when appointed to his office.—In giving this account of Mr. Belsham's connexion with this institution, and the particulars of his removal, I have, as far as brevity would admit, used the language of his own recital. In the year 1789, the academy was again removed to Northampton, and subsequently to Wymondely.

But enough of the history of this institution; especially as what remains to be said, has the far more important reference to its character. Such a revolution as Dr. Porter intimates, would not have rewarded the slightest exertions it might have required in the friends of heresy, as he accounts them, to effect it. We assure him, that in no state of things could the cause of these men be more kindly fostered, than it was while this seminary remained under the care of its first evangelical instructor; and that, during his life and labours, it was the nursery of ministers to the societies of liberal dissenters throughout the kingdom. Now, if to any this historical fact appear enigmatical, our solution is ready at hand. The course of education pursued by this excellent man was, in deed and in truth, upon those catholic principles of unlimited inquiry and private judgment, with the *profession* and *acknowledgment* of which, happily, it is found neither safe nor wise altogether to dispense in "other seminaries;" and the consequence was, that a large proportion of the students came to conclusions very different from those of their master. Fortunately there is now before me a catalogue of Doddridge's pupils during the twenty-two years that the academy was under his care (from 1729 to 1751;) in which are to be found many names whose celebrity has reached our own country. I am not a little desirous that your readers should know what names they are; and, to take certain-

ly the most distinguished and familiar, they are the Rev. Job Orton, Rev. Hugh Farmer, Dr. John Aikin, Rev. Samuel Merriale, the well-known author of *Daily Devotions*, Dr. Andrew Kippis, and the pious and eloquent Rev. Newcome Cappe. I do not mean to apply to the first of these the remark just made in regard to the opinions of Doddridge's students. Orton's were probably very similar to those of his master, but he resembled him quite as much in his affectionate and candid temper.* He was a liberal Christian, in the best sense of that term at least. As to the others whom I have named, there will be no dispute where they are to be classed; and I think, that a fairer comment was never given upon the history of an institution, at once orthodox in doctrine and catholic in spirit, than this. Never shall we meet with a more unequivocal test of the natural result of a mode of education, which does indeed allow the "utmost latitude of inquiry." In truth, if there ever was an instructor whose whole character at once silenced doubts and objections as to the justice of such a conclusion, Doddridge surely was the man. Our opponents we have little doubt would indignantly reject the supposition, (and with good cause, who will deny?) that the "presence of God could be ever withdrawn" from the scenes which he honoured, or that "the spirit of piety could there decline." They will not admit, no, not for a moment, that he could ever suffer the "pure word of God to be adulterated by adventurous and unhallowed speculation." He was not the man, we are confident, to encourage that spirit of half-learned "pedantry, which produces rash and frivolous criticism on the Scriptures, which always delights in paradox, always believes where others doubt, and doubts where others believe."

In closing these remarks it would be ungrateful not to embrace the opportunity thus presented, of rendering Dr. Porter our thanks for pressing this subject upon our notice. It is impossible not to wish that those who are so eager to claim the name

* Of this, I cannot refrain from giving a specimen alike honourable to the writer, and to that most exemplary christian divine to whom it refers. It is to be found in a letter of Orton to the Rev. S. Palmer of Hackney. "Were I to publish an account of silenced and ejected ministers, I should be strongly tempted to insert Mr. Lindsey in the list, which he mentions in his *Apology* with so much veneration. He certainly deserves as much respect and honour as any one of them, for the part he has acted. Perhaps few of them exceeded him in learning and piety. I venerate him as I would any of your confessors. As to his particular sentiments, they are nothing to me. An honest pious man, who makes such a sacrifice to truth and conscience as he has done, is a glorious character, and deserves the respect, esteem, and veneration of every true Christian."

of Doddridge, were better acquainted with his real character, and evinced more practically their reverence for its authority. Let them not be too ready to forget the friendly intercourse in which he lived with the amiable and pious Lardner, of his great affection and esteem for whom, his letters contain a striking testimony. Let pastors and congregations alike remember, that when some narrow minds in his society would have excluded from the rights of Christian communion, an Arian believer, it was he who interposed a firm and steady resistance to the attempt, declaring himself ready to sacrifice his place and even his life, rather than suffer such a stigma to be cast upon one whose Christian character none could assail. Let it be impressed on his successors in the schools of the prophets, that no opinions which his pupils found reason to adopt, however remote from his own, produced any diminution of his assistance and kind regard, as his biographer Dr. Kippis has gratefully testified. If the wish were not altogether chimerical, we could desire to see all our schools of sacred instruction, committed to the care of men, if indeed so many could be found, altogether such as Doddridge in temper, character, and, we are willing to add, even opinions. That the interests of piety and charity would triumphantly flourish under such protection, will be readily conceded by all. And after the statement which has now been made, your readers will think it requires no spirit of prophecy, to discern the results which would follow in regard to those also of knowledge and truth.

ON FARMER'S HYPOTHESIS RESPECTING OUR LORD'S TEMPTATION.

Mr. Editor,

The following remarks were thrown together upon being requested by a friend to lend him Dr. Farmer's Essay on the Temptation. They are submitted to you with the hope of your approval, by Yours, &c.

PHILALETHES.

My Dear Friend,

THOUGH Dr. Farmer's dissertation on our Saviour's Temptation is ingenious, and discovers a sincere desire to attain and support the truth, yet as it does not appear to me to proceed upon just principles, I will suggest some thoughts which occurred to me in the perusal of it, and afterwards mention an exposition of the account of the Temptation, which seems to my judgment less exceptionable.

I have nothing to object to his first and second sections, in which he remarks on the common modes of explanation; he has indeed very well refuted them; but in his third section, he attempts to shew that by the words, "Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness," Matt. iv, 1. the evangelist means to intimate that the events subsequently described took place *in vision*. This does not seem a very natural mode of interpretation; and by comparing this passage with others in which the same phrase occurs, we may find, I think, a more probable signification; for instance, Isaiah xlviii. 16. "The Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me;" Luke, iv. 18. "The spirit of the Lord is upon me;" i. e. I am under a divine influence, I am sent by God. In like manner, I cannot but think it was the intention of the evangelist to signify merely that our Saviour was led into the wilderness by a divine impulse. That the Jews did not use the phrase "in the spirit," to signify in vision, seems to be proved by Ezekiel xi. 24. "Afterwards the spirit took me up, and brought me in vision by the spirit of God into Chaldea, to them of the captivity." *In vision* is here added to *the spirit*, and *by the spirit of God*. These phrases therefore alone do not signify in vision.*

Dr. Farmer adds, that it was a vision presented by God; and, as the evangelists declare, and the whole narration plainly indicates, that there was an actual and real temptation, he would stand liable to the charge of saying that the Almighty tempted his beloved Son; but to escape from this, he urges that it was an instructive and symbolical vision. Sec. 4. This is an idea which, to say the least, the evangelists do not suggest, and it seems to me to be in opposition to their meaning. They all say that it was a scene, not of instruction or of prophetic communication, but of temptation, and nothing else. How does it appear that instruction of any sort was conveyed to Jesus? He was left to himself, he answered from his own mind the suggestions and instigations of the evil one. Compare this scene with the vision of Peter, Acts x. 9—16, the object of which was to convey a moral lesson. We see the use of this from the error into which Peter fell, and which was immediately corrected by the voice from heaven. But Jesus fell into no error, and, as far as appears, received no instruction. "He was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin."

Another objection to Dr. Farmer's theory, is the agency by which he supposes the instruction to be conveyed. He does not, to be sure, maintain the actual presence of Satan, but he

* See Cappe's Critical Remarks, Vol. 2. p. 58.

conjectures that our Saviour saw him in vision ; that is, he supposes Christ to have seen an image of what I conceive never existed. I do not intend to give elaborately the arguments against the existence and agency of the Devil, but I will just hint at some of the reasons which induce me to regard the doctrine as false. First, the unreasonableness and apparent absurdity of supposing that there is a being able to cope with, and even to thwart Omnipotence itself. This, I grant, would weigh but little against the express declarations of Scripture, but I think it may be easily shewn that the idea has originated from an abuse of the language of the bible. Satan, in the Hebrew, means nothing more than an adversary, or opponent, and so it is frequently translated. Thus Numbers xxii. 22. "The angel of the Lord stood in the way for *an adversary* to Balaam." *Satan* in the original. Thus it is rendered likewise in 1 Kings xi. 14. 23. 25. Compare also 1 Chron. xxi. i. with 2 Sam. xxiv. 1. In one of these places the anger of *the Lord*, and in the other, the instigation of *Satan*, is referred to as the cause of the same effect. In the New Testament, Satan is said to have entered into Judas, John xiii. 27 ; and Peter says to Ananias, "Why hath Satan entered into thine heart," Acts v. 3. What can be the meaning of these passages, unless we suppose Satan to mean evil intentions, or bad passions ?

Great stress is laid upon the unclean spirits or devils, so often mentioned in the gospels. By these I think are meant diseases of various kinds, which were supposed by the Jews of that age, to be owing to possession by devils. A spirit of uncleanness, or an unclean spirit, was used by them in the same manner as a spirit of infirmity.* Luke xiii. 11. 12.

This doctrine, which has arisen from a misconception of the language, seems to me to be in direct opposition to the spirit of the holy Scriptures. Nothing can be more explicitly contradicted than is this doctrine, which savours so strongly of Magianism, by Isaiah xlv. 7. "I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and create evil, I the Lord do all these things;" and by Amos iii. 6. "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath done it ? St. James says, i. 13. 14. "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God ; for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man ; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust." A strong and almost necessary inference from this passage is, that our own corrupt hearts, our own vicious inclinations, are the *only* tempters to whose influence we are exposed, the *only adversaries* to God and holiness to whose power we

* See Lardner's Discourses on the Dæmoniacs mentioned in the N. T.

are subjected. From these passages, we may infer that the apostles and evangelists merely adopted the popular phraseology of their times, without intending to imply any assent, or give any confirmation to the doctrine, which, in its literal meaning, this language supposes.

But whether the personal existence of the Devil be believed or not, the theory which supposes his agency in this transaction, either real or visionary, must still be regarded as equally faulty. For how is it possible to believe that such a being as Satan could offer temptation to our Lord? Who can suppose that even the weakest and most worthless of men could listen, with any other feelings than those of horror and aversion, to proposals regarded as proceeding immediately from Satan, whether really appearing in a bodily shape, or whether only imagined thus to appear. It is necessary, therefore, either to give up the idea of the personal appearance of Satan, whether in reality or in vision, or to contradict the assertion of the sacred historians, who declare that this transaction was properly a temptation. Dr. Farmer seems somewhat perplexed between these alternatives, and unsuccessfully attempts to shew that the objection, the weight of which he allows with respect to the common mode of interpretation, does not apply to his. He, at one moment, regards this scene as an actual temptation, and at another, as designed to convey prophetic and moral instruction. This produces a confusion and want of simplicity, which is another important objection to his system.

The reasons, then, which oblige me to regard his theory as erroneous, are, 1. that there is nothing in the evangelists to justify his supposition that the scene took place in vision; on the contrary, every thing indicates that it was, in some way or other, a real transaction; 2. that there is nothing which looks like a design to convey instruction, whether prophetic or moral; that none was either needed or given; 3. that neither reason nor scripture authorizes the belief of the existence of any evil principle like our idea of Satan, and it is therefore unreasonable to suppose that God would produce a visionary representation of such a being; 4. that he could possess no power of tempting our Lord, either in his own person, or in a visionary representation; 5. that there is a great want of simplicity and perspicuity in Dr. Farmer's manner of explaining the narrative.

I will now propose what seems to me a preferable mode of exposition. I suppose that Jesus, immediately after his baptism, being full of the holy spirit, was led by a divine influence to the wilderness. It is natural and easy to conjecture that he spent the forty days in prayer, meditation, and direct com-

munication with the Deity ; that it was a scene of preparation for his ministry. He had just received his miraculous powers, and his commission to preach the glad tidings of salvation. He was in an entirely new and untried situation. What more natural than that he should retire to the solitude of a desert, to meditate on the trials, temptations, and sufferings that he knew must await him, and to pray for strength to do the will of his heavenly Father? Emaciated by fasting, enfeebled in body, and worn down by long exertion of mind, some doubts or hesitation might have occurred to him with respect to the proper use of the miraculous powers with which he had just been endued. "Why should I not, he might have said, exert my powers for my own benefit. Why should I not at least supply the present necessities of my body, and command these stones to be made bread? If I am indeed the Son of God, if I have not been deceived by my own imagination, it will surely be done at my command. But no, the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give even his life a ransom for many. My powers have been given me as proofs of the divinity of my mission, and not to relieve my own necessities, or for my own benefit. In these respects I must trust like others to the providence of God, who will supply my wants, and preserve my life, by such means as may seem to Him most fit."

Again, Jesus compared his present, solitary, deserted, and enfeebled state, with the splendour and magnificence which the Jews expected in their Messiah. "Are they not right? Would the king of God's peculiar people be left in this neglected, and seemingly wretched condition? How grand and how striking a proof would it be, that I had come to be their king and deliverer, were I to cast myself down from a pinnacle of the temple, and astonish and dazzle the gazing multitude with the attendance of legions of angels! But it cannot be. The Messiah, the Saviour of the world, is not to appear with the splendour of royalty; he is not to receive honour in this world. He is to be despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, he must be oppressed and afflicted, and at last cut off out of the land of the living. I will not then, though I am encouraged to it by a passage of Scripture, I will not tempt God by demanding of him a proof of his favour, which he does not choose to give. Father, not my will, but thine be done."

He afterwards made some reflections on the effects which his miraculous powers might produce upon the world. "I can, by means of these powers, raise for myself a kingdom which shall embrace all the nations of the earth, which shall surpass in

glory all that has ever been seen or known. But it must be by breaking my allegiance to my heavenly king, it must be by disobeying the commands of Him by whose authority I am enabled to work these miracles. I am satisfied. My kingdom is not of this world. I look for my eternal reward at the right hand of the majesty of heaven."

This explanation is simple, clear, and to me satisfactory. It is free from all those inconsistencies and contradictions which arise from supposing either the real or visionary interposition of the Devil, and it is justified by the use of similar phraseology both in the Old and New Testament, where the suggestions of the Devil, or of Satan, are put for the temptations to which we are exposed from ourselves. Let not any one say that it degrades the character of our Lord and Master. Dr. Farmer has shewn, and none can deny, that he was subject to temptation. He bore our nature, and there is not a single feeling or affection which belongs to man, however innocent or even praise-worthy, but may become the source of temptation and sin. It is not of the slightest consequence whether the temptation proceed from within or without. It cannot be charged to us as a sin, that a thought of what is evil has passed through our minds. It is in cherishing those thoughts till they become wishes, and those wishes till they ripen into actions, that guilt consists; and there cannot be a higher or nobler effort of virtue, there cannot be a stronger proof of our love to God, and our aspirations after the purity and perfection of his nature, than that we should banish the thought and conquer the desire of evil, as soon as it rises within us.

It seems to me impossible that this temptation of our Saviour should have arisen except from his own thoughts. Let any one reflect a moment upon what would be his own sensations, were the very principle of evil himself to stand before him, either really or in a dream or vision, and offer him the kingdoms of this world, and the glory of them, upon the condition of his paying to the offerer the homage due to God alone. Would not his whole soul revolt from the proposal? What other ideas than those of horror and disgust would enter his mind?—Could then the pure and perfect Jesus be liable to temptation from such a being? God forbid that I should think so. Who is chargeable with imputing to our Lord what is disgraceful and degrading, if not he who maintains that the worst of spirits had power to affect his mind for a moment?

I have thus, my friend, briefly stated my objections to Dr. Farmer's exposition, and my own views of our Saviour's temptation. That they may receive the sanction of your approbation is the hope of,
Yours as ever,
P.

ON THE USE AND MEANING OF THE PHRASE,
"HOLY SPIRIT."

THERE is perhaps no term or phrase of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, with which readers in general are more perplexed, and concerning the meaning of which they feel more doubtful, than that of "*holy ghost*", or "*holy spirit*." We see the words printed in our Bibles, and in other books, in capitals, or with capital initials, and it gives us the impression of a person or agent of high dignity; at the same time that the connexion in which it stands, and the scope of the passage, often assure us, that a person cannot be intended.

Two observations occur in the outset in our examination into the use and meaning of *holy spirit*, in the writings of the New Testament. The first is, that we find several other forms of expression, such as, *spirit of God*, *spirit of the Lord*, *spirit of Christ*, and *spirit* alone, to be used in the same sense as *holy spirit*, or *holy ghost*. The following is an example, in which three of the above phrases are, in a single sentence, used to mean the same thing, whatever it be, as "the holy ghost," which is in other passages often represented to be in christians, and to dwell in them. Rom. viii. 9. "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the *spirit*, if so be that the *spirit of God* dwell in you: now if any man have not the *spirit of Christ*, he is none of his. But if Christ be in you, &c."

The second observation is, that we do not find the phrase in question, nor either of the synonymous phrases to have one uniform sense in which it is always used. On the contrary, we soon discover, when we come to read with a careful attention to its use, that it has several meanings, which in each case are to be learned only from the connexion in which it stands, and the scope of the passage in which it is found.

This observation will be supported by mentioning a few of the several senses, in which it may be shewn, that the *holy spirit*, and other parallel phrases, are used by the sacred writers.

1. In the first place, each of the phrases in question is sometimes used for *God himself*. The true meaning, in this use of it, the more readily occurs on account of its analogy to a similar mode of expression, which we have in constant use. I mean *the spirit of a man*. Now by the *spirit of a man*, or a *man's spirit*, no one ever dreams of any thing else being intended but the *man himself*. "I am glad," said Paul to the Corinthians, (1 Cor. xvi. 17, 18.) of the coming of Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaïacus, for they have refreshed *my spirit* and *yours*."

That is, they have refreshed *me* and *you*. Equally obvious is the meaning of the following texts: (Gal. vi. 18.) "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with *your spirit.*" (2 Tim. iv. 22.) "The Lord Jesus Christ be with *thy spirit,*" i.e. be *with thee*. Again, (1 Cor. ii. 11.) "What man knoweth the things of a man, save the *spirit of a man*, that is in him?" In this, as in the preceding instances, we are at no loss what we are to understand by the *spirit of a man*. It is the man himself. Now, when, proceeding in the use of the same language, he says in the following verse, "even so the things of God knoweth no one, but the *spirit of God*;" can there be any doubt, whether he applies the same language in a similar manner, meaning by it, none but *God himself* knoweth them?

This use of *holy spirit* and *spirit of God*, we meet with not unfrequently in the Old Testament. (Psalm cxxxix. 7.) "Whither shall I go from *thy spirit*?" i. e. from *thee*; for he immediately adds;—"If I ascend up into heaven, *thou* art there." The prophet Isaiah, (lxiii. 10.) speaking of the ingratitude of the people of Israel to God for their distinguished blessings, says, "They rebelled and vexed *his holy spirit.*" By comparing this passage with others in which the same conduct is referred to, we are left at no loss in what sense we are to understand *his holy spirit* here. Thus in the history of the transactions, (Num. xiv. 11.) we learn, that when the Israelites, hearing the report of those, who had been sent forward to search the land of Canaan, were on the point of revolting, and returning back to Egypt, "The Lord said unto Moses, how long will this people provoke *me*?" And in the Psalms which were composed in reference to these same transactions, in which this spirit of ingratitude and rebellion, which burst forth on several occasions, is alluded to; it is said, (Psl. lxxviii. 56.) "They tempted and provoked the *Most High God.*" (Psl. xcv. 9.) "Your fathers tempted *me*, proved *me*, and saw *my works.*" These passages are evidently parallel, and intended to convey the same meaning. The historian, the sacred poet, and the prophet, referring to the same transaction, unquestionably meant to represent *the same person*, as the object of it, by the several terms, *Jehovah*, *Most High God*, and *his holy spirit*.

That this is the most usual meaning of *the spirit of God* in the Old Testament, I believe, will hardly admit a question. It is also as uniformly the meaning of *my spirit*, *his spirit*, and *thy spirit*, whenever they occur in reference to God. When God speaks of *his spirit*, we have as little apprehension that another person, distinct from the speaker, is intended, as when a man speaks of his spirit. Nor is this use of *the spirit of God*,

and the *holy spirit*, confined to the Old Testament. Very clear and decisive instances of it occur in the New. "Know ye not, says Paul, (1 Cor. vi. 19.) that your body is the temple of the holy ghost?" That by the *holy ghost* is here meant *God* himself, appears from two or three parallel passages. (1 Cor. iii. 16.) "Know ye not that ye are the temple of *God*?" (2 Cor. vi. 16.) "Ye are the temple of the living *God*, as *God* hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them."

2. There is, in the second place, a class of texts, in which the phrases in question appear to be used, not to express the *person* of *God*, as in the preceding cases, but the *power* of *God*, his *wisdom*, his *will*, or his *command*. (Mich. ii. 7.) "Is the *spirit* of the Lord straitened?" (Is. lix. 1.) "Behold the Lord's *hand* is not shortened, that it cannot save." These texts are evidently parallel, intended to express the same meaning. There can be no doubt that the former prophet, by the *spirit of the Lord*, meant the same, as the latter did by the *Lord's hand*; viz. *his power*. Is the power of *Jehovah* restrained?

In one of the eloquent replies of Job, (xxvi. 12, 13.) a remarkable instance occurs, in which, speaking of the majesty of *God*, and his wonderful works, the turn of expression is varied four times, without changing its meaning, in a single sentence. "He divided the sea by his *power*, and by his *understanding* he smiteth through the proud: by his *spirit* he hath garnished the heavens, his *hand* hath formed the crooked serpent." The intelligent reader needs no comment on this passage. He understands the same divine operation to be expressed, and not four distinct persons to be intimated, by the several terms *power*, *understanding*, *spirit*, and *hand*. In a similar manner, in the following passage, (Psl. xxxiii. 6.) "By the *word* of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the *breath*, or *spirit*, of his mouth,"—he understands the *word*, in one part of the sentence, and the *breath* or *spirit* in the other, to mean the same thing, viz: that divine energy by which all things were brought into being. It may be proper, however, to inform the reader, unlearned in polemic divinity, that this interpretation is not assented to by all. Some have discovered in this text the three persons of the trinity: the first person, the Father, designated by the term *Lord*, or *Jehovah*; the second, or the Son, by the *word*; the third, or the *Holy Ghost*, by the *breath*, or *spirit*.

Whether such interpretations are calculated to do honor to the scriptures, the common sense of sober enquirers will determine.

Our Saviour, reasoning with the Jews respecting his authority as a divine teacher, and the power by which he wrought

miracles, said to them, (Matt. xii. 28.) "If I cast out demons by the *spirit* of God, then is the kingdom of God come unto you." By another Evangelist, (Luke xi. 20.) he is represented, on the same occasion, as saying, "If I with the *finger* of God cast out demons, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you." The two forms of expression then, *spirit of God* and *finger of God*, were understood by the Evangelists to mean the same thing. What that meaning was, we learn from our Saviour, when he said on another occasion, (John xiv. 10.) "The *Father* that dwelleth in me, he doth the works." We have it confirmed also by Peter, in his speech on the day of Pentecost. (Acts ii. 22.) "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles, and signs, and wonders, which *God did* by him." The *spirit of God* then, and the *finger of God*, were the *power of God*, or God himself, the Father, dwelling in Jesus Christ.

Similar examples of the use of the *spirit of God* for the *power of God*, might be multiplied. One more only shall be mentioned. (2 Cor. iii. 3.) "Ye are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the *spirit* of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart." The allusion in this text is to the two tables received by Moses on Mount Sinai, on which were written the ten commandments. Now turning to the account of this transaction in Exodus and Deuteronomy, (Ex. xxxi. 18, Deut. ix. 10.) we find them there declared to be written with the *finger of God*. The Apostle therefore probably meant the same thing, when he said, written by the *spirit of God*. Each was intended to express an effect produced supernaturally, by the power of God himself.

3. The terms under consideration are used, again, sometimes to express a single gift or endowment, such as, *power*, *wisdom*, *courage*, or *skill* in some art,—whether properly miraculous, or only possessed in an extraordinary degree, so as to qualify the person for some special office or service. Thus is the bodily strength of Sampson spoken of, and the impulse by which he exerted it;—the valour and intrepidity of Othniel, of Jephtha, and of Gideon, in conducting the armies of their country, and delivering it from the power of its enemies. In each instance it is said, the *spirit of the Lord*, came upon him. (Judges xiv. 5, 6. iii. 10. xi. 29. vi. 34.)

A similar mode of expression is applied to Moses and Joshua in reference to the wisdom and skill, with which they conducted the nation, administered its affairs, and settled it in the promised land. Particularly, when the seventy elders were appointed to relieve Moses from a part of the burden of govern-

ment, of which he complained, as being greater than he could bear. (Num. xi. 16, 17.) "The Lord said unto Moses, I will take of the *spirit*, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them." There can be no doubt, I think, what is here meant. It was not, that something was literally to be taken from Moses on that occasion, and given to the elders who were to be his assistants: nor that an exalted person or being was to depart from him, and reside in them. They were to be qualified for the office to which they were to be appointed, and fitted for its duties, by possessing talents resembling his; by being endowed, as he was, with eminent wisdom, integrity, meekness, and impartiality.

Another instance of a similar application of the phrase *spirit of God*, occurs in the account we have of the designation of persons to construct the tabernacle and its furniture. It is applied to that ingenuity and mechanical skill, by which Bezaleel and Aholiab were qualified to superintend the work, and to understand all the directions, and to execute the commands, which Moses had received. It was said, (Ex. xxxi. 1, 7.) "That they were filled with the *spirit of God*, in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning work in gold, and in silver, and in brass, in cutting of stone, in carving of wood, in the work of the engraver, the weaver, and the embroiderer." Expressions of similar import are applied also to all those, whom they were directed to teach the skill which they possessed in these arts, and to employ as assistants in executing the work. (Ex. xxxvi. 1, 2.)

In the writings of the prophets, the expressions continually occur of "giving, sending, pouring out the *spirit of God*," not in such a manner as to lead to the thought, that a person is intended; but sometimes to express the grant of a gift, power, privilege, or blessing, and sometimes a disposition produced, temper imparted, or change of moral character.

A similar application of the language and terms in question runs through the New Testament. They are used to express the power, by which our Saviour performed miracles in proof of his divine mission; and the powers and gifts also, which were imparted to his Apostles after his ascension, by which they were qualified to go forth into the world, with knowledge and courage to execute their commission, and with supernatural powers to support their claims as divine messengers; to prove (John xvii. 18.) that they were sent into the world by Christ, as he was sent into the world by the Father.

What was meant by the promise of the *Comforter*; (John xvi. 7.) the *holy ghost* with which they were to be baptized; (Acts i. 5.) they learned, when they found themselves, after

the ascension of their master, endowed with supernatural powers. By these powers, sometimes denominated the *spirit of God*, sometimes the *spirit of Christ*, sometimes the *holy spirit*, they were qualified for the work to which they were appointed, that of converting the world to the christian faith.

In express allusion to the effusion of miraculous powers thus to take place afterward on the day of Pentecost, the Evangelist John had said, (in explanation of a declaration of our Saviour,) that "he spake it of *the spirit*, which they that believe on him should receive; for," adds he, "the *holyghost* was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified." (John vii. 39.) i.e. those miraculous powers, which were exercised by the apostles at the time when he wrote, were not yet in existence, had not yet been bestowed, were not to be bestowed, till after the ascension of their master. So also, when the christians whom Paul found at Ephesus, in answer to his question, whether they had yet received the *holy ghost*, replied, that they "had not even heard, that there was a holy ghost;" their meaning was, that they had not heard of the existence of those miraculous powers; for it is added, "when Paul laid his hands upon them, the *holy ghost* came upon them, and they *spake with tongues.*"

4. Another use of *spirit* and *holy spirit*, too important and of too frequent occurrence to be omitted, is that by which they express the moral influence employed by God in any way, for the purpose of producing in men holiness and virtue; or any of the effects of that influence, i. e. the disposition, temper, and habits thus produced. Thus, when Stephen says to the Jews, (Acts vii. 51.) "Ye do always resist the *holy ghost*, as your fathers did, so do ye;"—he must mean, by the *holy ghost*, all those means, which God employed in present and preceding dispensations to effect the great ends of his moral government. All these they had resisted, and found means to prevent their effects and defeat their design.

In the next preceding chapter also, (Acts vi. 3, 5.) when the qualifications for the office of deacons are mentioned, viz.: "that they be full of the *holy ghost* and wisdom;" or, as it is without the article, "a *holy spirit* and wisdom," there seems good reason for supposing, when we consider the design of the office, that a moral quality, *holiness*, was meant, and not a spiritual gift: As also, when it is said of Stephen, after his election to the office, that he was "full of faith, and a *holy spirit*;"—And when on another occasion, the same language was applied to Barnabas, (Acts xi. 24.) "He was a good man, full of the *holy spirit* and of faith." This interpretation however, as to the last cases, is not to be urged with entire confidence; since, with respect to these persons, appointed to the office of deacon, one

of them, we are afterward expressly told, and another of them, we have reason from the circumstances of the history to believe, were endowed with miraculous powers. The words *may* therefore here, as in other cases, have been used to express spiritual gifts, and not a moral quality.

Several other uses of the words *spirit*, *spirit of God*, *holy spirit*, &c. having no connexion with the design of this essay, may be passed without notice.

One other use of them, however, by christians in general, probably believed to be their most common use, requires to be distinctly considered.

For although some one of the meanings already mentioned will furnish, as all must admit, a satisfactory explanation of most of the texts in which either of the terms in question occur; there are some to which, in the minds of many, neither of them is applicable. Personal characteristics, it is thought, are employed by the sacred writers in such a manner, as is consistent only with the notion of a distinct Agent or Being, of an exalted character, to which they belong, and that the several terms we are considering, are used as the name of that Agent.

The *spirit*, or *holy spirit*, it is alleged, is described as possessing the attributes, and performing the functions of a person. It is described as understanding, willing, and acting. (1 Cor. ii. 11, &c.) "It knoweth all things, searcheth even the deep things of God, and revealeth them to men." It is represented as "speaking to men," pleading with them, and interceding for them; as bearing testimony to the Saviour, reproving, teaching, bringing to remembrance, and being grieved with men for their perverseness, in neglecting its aids and rejecting its guidance. (Acts xxviii. 25. Rom. viii. 26. John xiv. xv. xvi. Eph. iv. 30.)

Now in order to satisfy ourselves whether real personality be necessarily implied in the use of such language, or not, it is to our purpose to examine other instances of the application of personal attributes by the sacred writers, where there can be no pretence, that a distinct person is intended. Both the Old and New Testament abound in examples of bold personification. Let us examine a few of them, in order to ascertain how near a resemblance they bear to the one in question.

"This stone," said Joshua to the Israelites, when he had confirmed the covenant with them in the land of Canaan, (Joshua xxiv. 26, 27.) "this stone shall be a witness unto us, for *it hath heard* all the words of the Lord, which he spake to us." In this instance, though a personal character could hardly have been more clearly expressed, no mistake is ever made as to the meaning of the passage. No reader ever imagines that

stone to have been an intelligent agent, as the words so clearly imply, literally listening to the ratification of the covenant, for the purpose of attesting the fact to future ages.

In some of the first chapters of Proverbs, (Ch. i. ii. iii. iv. viii. ix.) we have a remarkable instance of the personification of wisdom. Yet, though all the attributes of person seem to be applied, not in single epithets only, but in continued discourse, in lively description, in variety of action, we can have no doubt that a figurative and not a real person is intended. We are perfectly satisfied that a mere allegorical person, and not a real being or agent is meant, when she is declared to have "builded her house, furnished her table, mingled her wine, sent forth her maidens to invite her guests; and from the high places, from the gates, the entrance of the city, to utter her voice, proclaim her warnings, offer her instructions, and pronounce her benedictions on those who will hear, and her reproofs against those who reject, her offers and despise her counsels."

What life and vigour does Paul infuse into his Epistles, by his bold personification of sin and death! (Rom. v. 14, 17. vi. 12, 14, 17, 23. 1 Cor. xv. 26, 55—57.) representing them as having power, exercising dominion, reigning over men, and being enemies; yet without ever misleading the judgment of the reader into the apprehension that he is describing real persons.

How beautiful, again, is St. Paul's picture of charity drawn in the 13th chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians! Yet, though it presents us throughout with the attributes of a *person*, instead of the characteristics of a virtue, no one is led into a mistake; or has a doubt whether or not a real person be meant.

These instances, it seems to me, are sufficiently parallel to those, in which the *personality of the holy spirit* is supposed to be expressed, to furnish a satisfactory explanation of, at least, the most of them; since they shew, that a similar mode of interpretation is required, and is perfectly satisfactory, when applied to the language used by the same writers on other subjects.

But there is one passage, which may be thought to require a more distinct consideration, because more stress is laid on it than on any other single passage, as a proof of the personality of the spirit; and because the personal characteristics in it are supposed to be more difficult to explain on any other ground, but that of a literal personality, than those expressed on any other occasion. I refer to our Saviour's discourse to his disciples on the evening before his crucifixion, contained in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth chapters of John.

In order to console them on that occasion, and prepare them for the loss they were so soon to sustain, he promised to send them "another comforter to abide with them for ever." This comforter, he tells them, is the *spirit of truth*, who was to guide them into all truth. It is the holy ghost, whom the Father," said he, "will send in my name; he will teach you all things, and will bring all things to your remembrance. He will not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that will he speak, and he will shew you things to come. He will glorify me, for he will receive of mine, and shew it unto you. Him I will send unto you, and when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment."

Now the meaning of these passages is to be ascertained by attending to the three following things: viz.

1. By comparing the language of our Saviour in this discourse with that, which was used by him on other occasions, when evidently speaking of the same thing.

2. By observing how this promise was actually fulfilled, as related in the subsequent history.

3. And then, by placing this in comparison with other acknowledged instances of personification to be found in the sacred writings, so as to see whether the difference be such, that while one is confessed to be a figurative person only, the other cannot be so.

1. In the first place then, the several terms used by our Saviour on this occasion, viz. the *comforter*, the *spirit of truth*, and the *holy ghost*, or *holy spirit*, are manifestly used to mean one and the same thing; and there is nothing to lead us to the supposition, that *holy spirit*, thus used as synonymous to *comforter*, is used in any new or uncommon sense. Besides, when our Saviour said, "I will pray the Father, and he will give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever;" can we have any doubt that he meant the same thing, as when he said to them after his resurrection, according to the representation of another evangelist, (Matt. xxviii. 20.) "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world?" So also, whatever was meant by the *spirit of truth* to guide them into all truth, and the *holy spirit* to teach them all things, and bring all things to their remembrance; can there be any question whether the same were not also meant, when on another occasion he expressed the guidance and aid they should enjoy, in executing the commission which they were to receive, by saying, (Luke xxi. 15.) "I will give you a *mouth and wisdom*, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist." (Matt. x. 20.) "It shall be given you in that hour what ye shall speak; for it is not ye that speak, but the *spirit*

of your Father, that speaketh in you." The promise also, which we find in immediate connexion with that of the comforter, as it seems to be but a repetition of the same promise in other words, may be considered as helping us to understand the meaning of the other. "I will not leave you comfortless, *I will come unto you.*" In what sense was he to *come to them*, and, as expressed on the other occasion, to *be with them always, even to the end of the world*? Not personally, but by that being, person, power, influence, or what ever it be, which had just been spoken of as the Comforter, the spirit, the spirit of the Father, the spirit of Christ, the spirit of truth, the holy spirit.

2. Let us now, in the second place, look into the subsequent history, and see what account we can find of the manner, in which these promises were actually fulfilled. No interpretation of a promise can be more fair or satisfactory than that, which is drawn from its fulfilment. It is the interpretation of him who made it, and must be supposed more competent than any other to decide in what sense it was meant to be understood.

A few days after our Saviour's ascension, his disciples were assembled together at Jerusalem by the express injunction of their master, when, alluding to his former promise, he said to them, (Luke xxiv. 49.) "*Behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you; but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high.*" They tarried at Jerusalem accordingly until the day of Pentecost, when the promise was fulfilled; not as a literal interpretation of the promises, on which they relied, might have led them to expect, by the appearance of a great personage to live among them, to be their leader, and to supply the place of their ascended Lord; nor yet by *his* personal return to them; but by the gift of extraordinary powers, by which they were enabled to perform miracles, to speak in other tongues, were enlightened with a knowledge of the whole scheme of the Gospel, were enabled to preach it with undaunted courage, and to support labours, dangers, and sufferings, in propagating it, with inflexible firmness and resolution.

No other account of the fulfilment of those promises is given. No intimation do we find that any other was expected. And we meet with frequent allusion to *this* in the subsequent history and the Epistles. The persons thus endued with miraculous powers, were said to be *filled with the holy ghost*, to be baptized with the *holy ghost*. The *spirit* was said to be *poured out upon them*. (Acts ix.) And the miracles which they performed in the exercise of these powers are sometimes mentioned as done by *Christ*, sometimes by *God*, sometimes

"through the effectual working of the power of God." (Eph. iii. 7.)

Thus when Peter, by the power thus communicated to him, cured the paralytic man at Lydda, (Acts ix. 32,) he said, "Eneas, *Jesus Christ* maketh thee whole;" a mode of expression different from what we should have expected, if by the *holy ghost* which fell upon him on the day of Pentecost, was meant, not a *power only*, but a *person*, and a person distinct from Jesus Christ.

Whatever was meant (Acts ii. 33.) by the "promise of the holy ghost," fulfilled in what took place on the day of Pentecost, the same was meant (Luke iii. 22.) by the "*holy ghost*," which descended upon Jesus Christ himself at his baptism; and whatever was meant, when it was said (Acts ii. 4.) that the disciples were filled with the "*holy ghost*" on the former occasion, the same was meant, when on the latter, it is said, (Luke iv. 1.) that Jesus "was full of the holy ghost, when he returned from Jordan," after his baptism. But in this case, the supposition that a person was meant, and not a power or influence, will seem to imply, that the miracles of our Saviour were wrought, not by his *own power*, nor, as he himself asserted, (John xiv. 10.) by "*the Father who dwelt in him*;" but by another person.

3. If, in the third place, we compare the example under consideration with other acknowledged instances of personification in the Scriptures, do we find such a difference as to justify us in the conclusion, that while *those* are understood to refer only to a figurative person, *this* cannot be so understood?

Let the instances which have before been selected, be now brought again before the reader's view. Let him compare the discourse of our Saviour in John, relative to the *comforter*, the *spirit of truth*, the *holy ghost*, with Solomon's beautiful portrait of wisdom, and Paul's lively description of charity. Will he find personal attributes any where ascribed to the *holy spirit* in greater variety, or with more distinctness, than in these instances they are applied to *wisdom* and *charity*? Let him recur, also, to the personal epithets applied by Paul to sin and death. Death is, indeed, so constantly in the common language of life, represented in personal characters, that it never fails to present itself to us under that image; and though no one actually believes it to be a real person, the image has so fastened itself upon our minds, that it costs no small effort to correct the impression.

Other personifications less remarkable, will yet serve to illustrate the one in question. I will mention only one more, that of the *word of God*. Now, when we read (Heb. xi. 3. 2 Pet.

iii. 5.) that "the worlds were framed by the *word of God* ;" that "by the *word of God* the heavens were of old :"
we have no doubt that the agency of *God himself* is meant, in the same manner as in the expression, (Gen. i. 3.) "*God said*, let there be light and there was light." We perceive only a figurative, but far from unusual mode, of saying that *God himself* created the heavens, the worlds, and the light. The same is meant as when it is said of those, who call upon God in their afflictions, (Psl. cvii. 20.) "*He sendeth his word* and healeth them ;" and of the ice and frosts of winter, (Psl. cxlvii. 18.) "*He sendeth out his word* and melteth them."

There is one other view of the subject, which it may not be useless just to suggest. It will be admitted by all, whatever their opinion respecting the personality of the spirit, that the terms *spirit*, *spirit of God*, &c. are commonly used in such a manner, as evidently not to mean a person. Now, let the experiment be made upon some other word, for the purpose of ascertaining whether another instance can be found of a term sometimes used as the name of a person, but more commonly employed in a different manner. No such example, it is presumed, can be produced. There are indeed instances, in which *Christ* is used, by a very common metonymy, for the religion, which he taught, and Moses for the law which he promulgated : the names of the prophets also, and of each separate prophet, for the books that bear their names. But this is so rare, compared with the literal use of the name to express the person himself, that no one was ever led to doubt, whether in their common use they did not refer to real persons. It would be impossible, by any ingenuity, to explain them as meaning nothing more than an allegorical personality. It never did, nor could enter into the mind of any reader of the bible, that *Christ* or *Moses* were not real, but only allegorical persons.

But in the case in question, on the commonly received opinion, the name of a most important person and powerful agent is usually employed to express a mere power or gift, or the influence or agency of *another person*. The presumption therefore is strong, that the opinion itself is without foundation ; a presumption, which nothing but positive proof to the contrary can remove ; and such proof we do not find.

From the whole view of the subject, we are brought to the following conclusion. That the phrase under consideration is used by the sacred writers in a variety of senses, and what is the true meaning is to be ascertained in each instance by the same rules of interpretation, which are applied in other similar cases. That, whenever it is used as a person, it is the person of the Father ; as it is sometimes expressed, *the spirit of the*

Father ; and that there is not sufficient reason for supposing, that it is ever used to mean a being, agent, or person distinct from God the Father.

Note.—For a more thorough investigation of this subject, than could be brought within the limits of an essay of reasonable length for a periodical publication, the reader is referred to the first postscript of Dr. Lardner's Letter on the Logos,—and the translation of "Schleusner on the meanings of *πρὸς* in the New Testament," in the first volume of the General Repository, for April, 1812. In one or the other of those tracts, he will find some explanation of every text, that is usually considered as having any relation to the subject.

ILLUSTRATION OF JOHN, xiv. 31.

"But that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment, even so I do. Arise, let us go hence."

The reader will instantly perceive that the first clause of this verse is defective. There is evidently something wanted to complete its meaning; and different translators have resorted to different expedients, for representing it fairly and fully. In most of our recent English translations, the words "this must be," or words of a similar import, are interposed, as if understood. "*But this must be* that the world, &c." This method is certainly without any critical objections: for a similar ellipsis is found in other parts of the writings of this same apostle. We read in the 25th verse of the next chapter: "*but this cometh to pass*, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law; they hated me without a cause:" and again, (1 John ii. 19.) "*but they went out*, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us."

Some critics have supposed the passage to be complete in itself, without the aid of any supplementary words; and render it thus: "but that the world may know that I love the Father, even as the Father hath given me commandment, so I do." Of this opinion, were the eminent Grotius, Bengel, and others: but their construction is too forced a one to be readily admitted. Mr. Wakefield and Bishop Pearce agree in connecting the passage with the preceding verse as a part of it. There would be no objection to this, provided a natural and appropriate meaning could thus be obtained: for the punctuation of the Greek Testament is clearly without any authority. The

most ancient manuscripts are written in continuous lines, without any division of the words, much less of the sentences. In the first printed editions the points were used arbitrarily; and Stephens is said to have varied them in every successive edition which he published. It was the same editor who divided the New Testament into its present order of verses; which is no older than the year 1551. Those learned men, however, were by no means happy in their emendation. Mr. Wakefield's translation is this: (30) "the ruler of this world is coming; and I have nothing to do (31) but to convince the world that I love the Father, &c." That of Bishop Pearce has still less to recommend it: "the Prince of this world cometh, and he shall find nothing in me, but that the world may know that I love the Father, &c."

It would present a very simple and beautiful meaning, merely to connect the passage in question with the remaining part of the verse: "but that the world may know that I love the Father, and do even as the Father has given me commandment, arise, let us go hence." They were to go, it will be remembered, to the garden of Gethsemane, where a most affecting proof was to be given of our Saviour's resignation to the whole will of his heavenly Father. We thus not only solve every difficulty, and perceive a very appropriate and touching allusion; but we relieve the abruptness, which the latter member of this verse would have, considered as an independent sentence. This abruptness is disguised in some measure by the arrangement of the chapters and verses; since most readers are accustomed to regard the end of a chapter as the end of a subject: but it will be immediately discerned, by reading the 31st verse of the 14th, and the 1st of the 15th chapter in continuation, as successive portions of the same discourse.

After these remarks were written, it was discovered, that this mode of reading the passage was adopted in Martin's edition of the French Bible, published in Amsterdam, in folio, 1707, and in 4to, 1722;—and is found in the German version of the celebrated Michaelis.

CORRESPONDENCE.

OUR readers doubtless recollect that in a review of "Eddy's Reasons," which appeared in the first number of this work, it was said, that there is in this town a Society of professed Unitarian Baptists. The statement has occasioned a good deal of enquiry, and the truth of it has been publicly denied. We

perhaps have not been sufficiently anxious to justify ourselves in the assertion, and have delayed doing it longer than we ought. We, however, at length lay before the publick a letter from one of the Society alluded to, written in answer to enquiries upon this subject, from which it may be judged how far we were correct, and how far we erred.

The following is the letter of enquiry.

To Mr. HENRY EMMONS.

SIR,

I trust you will excuse the freedom of the following enquiry, when you consider its importance.

In a number of the *Christian Disciple*, published last March, it was said, that "there is a society of professed Unitarian Baptists in Boston." The allusion was to the Society of which you are a member, and the writer supposed that his assertion was unquestionably correct.

But the Editors of the *Baptist Missionary Magazine* have denied it; and, if I understand them right, have asserted the contrary with regard to your church. It has also been denied in other ways. Now, Sir, if the *Disciple* has made an unfounded assertion, it ought to be retracted; if not, it ought to be defended. It was made upon the authority of a gentleman, who received his impression respecting the fact from a conversation with yourself. In order to give entire satisfaction, will you have the goodness to make explicit answer to the following questions?

Are the believers with whom you worship, rightly called Baptists?

Does the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, usually called the Trinity, make a part of their belief? Or, is there a division of opinion among them in regard to it?

My only object in this, as in other things, is, to know the truth, and tell the truth. Will you, therefore, write me an early reply, and believe me with christian salutations.

yours, &c.

The following answer was returned.

Boston, 3th Month, 6, 1819.

RESPECTED FRIEND,

When thy letter came I was not at home; but, with pleasure, freedom and correctness, I will answer it.

As to the paragraph inserted in the *Christian Disciple* in 3d Month last,—“Of there being a Society of professed Unitarian Baptists in Boston”—I have had the question repeatedly asked me.

In answer I will say, We are a small Company of Brethren, formed together for religious worship, in the year 1803, a part of whom came out, and others were turned out, from the Calvinistic Baptists, because our minds became more enlightened in some points of doctrine which thwarted the principles or creeds of their churches; and the liberties we wanted, of males and females “speaking one by one,” could not be granted us.

After we had embodied together, we thought best to take no sectarian name upon us, but we would call ourselves *Christians*, the original name by which believers were called in the days of old; frequently we are known or called by others, Freewill Baptists, as our members are baptized by immersion, as the Baptists do.

As to sentiments, we have no creeds or platforms to sign or assent to; but require of persons admitted, a relation to the church of their change of heart, &c. Yet, I plainly see, and will clearly exhibit to thee, what is desired in the first assertion. Though we have never called ourselves a professed Unitarian Baptist Society,—yet, if the following belief, among our members, constitutes the substance of the assertion made in the *Christian Disciple*, the publisher of the sentence has nothing to fear from the correctness of it, nor from the stand he has publicly taken in exhibiting truth, (I need not say in defending it) for the doctrine needs no supporters or props of man to make its consistency, glory, and lustre appear in the eyes of good men, who are not prejudiced “with the traditions of their fathers.”

The confused ideas respecting God and his dear Son, adopted and embraced among even pious people themselves, have been a great grief to the sons of Zion in all ages, since inventions of men were first brought into the church. Yet, though much noise and contention among them have been, respecting the character of God and Christ, there is a right, and there is a wrong report gone out in the world: to embrace the true, and arrest the false, where it can be done “without hurting the wine or the oil,” certainly every follower of Christ ought so to do.

As to the question asked in thy letter to me, “Does the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, usually called the Trinity, make a part of our belief? I answer, *no*. Some there may be: I know them not; generally, it is not the belief of our members. For our preachers, and leading brethren, who have

gifts in speech, frequently expatiate, in exhortations, upon the glorious character of Christ, "not, as we be slanderously reported," that we degrade, and lower down the illustrious, great and holy character of the Son of God! yet our brethren and preachers are always careful to avoid that confused mass of ideas, of asserting that Christ is God!! but rather exhibiting him to the assembly as the Mediator, Redeemer, Intercessor, and High Priest of Zion. Though some of the Prophets called him Mighty God, &c. Christ himself said, *men* are called gods. But to return.

The very Hymn Books we use, are another proof of the belief of our members, not only here, but scattered over the United States—in all of them we have the same ideas, some of them corrected from the mistakes of their authors, viz. Watts has one verse which looks grossly incorrect to us; therefore we have altered the third line, to

When Christ, the glorious Saviour, died.

"Well might the sun in darkness hide,
And shut his glories in,
When God, the Mighty Maker, died,
For man the creature's sin."

Now this is not true; for God never died, never eat and drank, never was weary, never was asleep in the sides of a ship, &c. But all this was true of his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things. We rationally conclude, if a King appoints any one heir of all things in his kingdom, he that appoints is greater than the appointed. Joseph was a type of Christ, appointed lord over all Egypt; yet in the throne there was one greater than he.

I hope what I have written, though lengthy, will be satisfactory to thee. If more witnesses are wanting for my assertions, I am at no loss to raise them. Farewell.

HENRY EMMONS.

THOUGHTS ON THE PROSPECTS OF RELIGION.

FOR THE CHRISTIAN DISCIPLE.

It is pleasant to look upon the bright side; in regard, especially, to the progress of truth and the improvement of mankind. We confess, that we are fond of indulging in such views. It is a disposition, we are sensible, that is apt to betray one into fanciful opinions, which will not bear the test of sober examination; and into an imagination of this nature we have possi-

bly been led in entertaining the idea, that rational religion is upon the advance;—that religion, we mean, which leans to reason; which never contradicts her fundamental principles; though its doctrines and sanctions are dependant upon a higher authority than hers.

We have thought, that rational beings must naturally incline to rational sentiments, when fairly presented to their minds. We have considered the victories, which reason has obtained over errors, once as generally embraced, as they are now generally exploded; and that the conquests, it has gained, it has rarely lost. We have attended to the rules of exposition, which rational christians, so termed, apply to the sacred volume; and we cannot but think they will ultimately prevail; being founded on the reasonable presumption, that the language of the scriptures is to be explained according to the established laws, by which other writings are interpreted;—laws, which possess the indispensable recommendation of being the only ones, which enable us to construe the Bible, without filling it with contradictions, and doing violence to the plainest truths of natural religion, which are equally truths of revelation. We have been gratified with observing, how many of the principal members of society are men of candid feelings and temperate sentiments on religious subjects. We have noticed, that enlargement of views in regard to those controversies, which are agitated among christians, is *apt* to accompany enlargement of mind in other respects; and it may be presumed, therefore, is increasing with the diffusion of knowledge and learning.

But not the smallest of our reasons for expecting a more extensive spread of rational opinions and liberal feelings in the church, are such, as we derive from those christians themselves, among whom there exists, as we think, the most room for improvement in these respects.

In the first place, it is encouraging to remember to how large a portion of the sacred volume they have always applied those rules of interpretation, which their brethren contend should be equally applied to every part of it. None could be more ready than they, to reject a number of erroneous doctrines, on the ground of their intrinsic unreasonableness and incredibility; particularly those of transubstantiation and consubstantiation; notwithstanding, the letter of scripture may be urged in their behalf. It must appear surprising, we are sensible, that they have not long since pursued a similar course with some other doctrines, equally repugnant to our intuitive perceptions of possibility, and infinitely more so to our first principles of rectitude; especially when less supported by any passages of sacred writ, either literally or freely expounded. Can

they say, it may well be asked, that the existence of Christ's body in the sacramental bread is more inconceivable, than the existence of three persons in one being, each possessing his own distinct will, consciousness, and office; or will they undertake to produce any scripture, for the latter notion, that is more direct or explicit, than those words of our Saviour, "*This is my body,*" upon which the former is grounded by the Lutherans and Papists! In like manner, with respect to the doctrine of total depravity, in vain do we look, it may be remarked, for one single passage to uphold this distinguishing article of Calvinism, equally pertinent and full with that, on which the Romanists have built the doctrine of transubstantiation, and equally unopposed by other portions of the Bible; while none can feel, that this Catholic tenet can compare, in horridness, with that of the final damnation of a great portion of our race for retaining a natural heart, which God alone could change, but which he chose to leave in the state, in which it came into existence. Notwithstanding our Calvinistic brethren, however, have not yet seen fit to extend rational principles of interpretation to every part of the sacred volume, since they continue to recognize their legitimacy, we do hope, they will one day pay them a consistent regard.

In the second place, we have much to expect, as we flatter ourselves, from that attention to biblical criticism, which is appearing among them. One of the finest scholars our country has produced in this department of sacred learning, has, in the opinion of some, arisen in their ranks. In many instances, no doubt, they will employ their critical learning with too little fairness and impartiality; especially they, who are more *interested* to uphold the fabrick of Calvinism; but gradually it must, we think, be apparent, that such works as Griesbach's New Testament, Schleusner's Lexicon, &c. cannot become popular with our students in divinity without producing such effects, as all must denominate happy, who are desirous of promoting a rational and consistent exposition of the scriptures.

In the third place, although a great clamour has been raised against new versions of the scriptures, various readings, and the like, proceeding in a great measure, no doubt, from want of due acquaintance with the subject; still, but too apparently designed, in some cases, to excite a stronger prejudice, than could, it should seem, have been entertained by the authors of the alarm; yet we are happy to learn, that the Old Greek text is giving place to Griesbach's, even in Calvinistic seminaries; while many of the most respectable orthodox critics on the other side of the water, have urged in strong terms the necessity of revising the common version of the Bible. Even the

celebrated passage respecting "the three, who bear witness in heaven," which has been so long urged, as one of the strongest texts in favour of the Trinity, is now losing its authority with its former advocates. A most respectable orthodox journal has pronounced it *disgraceful* to quote it. We cannot but think, that a number of passages in our common English version, which have been usually cited on the same side, will soon experience in a great degree, if not entirely, a similar fate; not indeed as spurious, but as inapplicable to the subject in debate; and that the progress of critical knowledge will ere long be found materially to have allayed the zeal of our Trinitarian brethren. This zeal, we are persuaded, must decline fast, as Christians shall agree, that the meaning of scripture on every subject it treats of, is to be determined by its general tenor; and that an inconsistent sense shall be attached to no passages, when any other can be found, which the passages will bear.

In the fourth place, we have leaned to the opinion, that what by many at the present day is denominated orthodoxy, compared with that of an earlier period, presents some features of amelioration. On this subject, however, we are not without a degree of jealousy, that our wishes have exercised too strong an influence over our judgment. We suspect, that orthodox congregations are less accustomed, than formerly, to hear of infants being justly liable to the eternal pains of hell. This doctrine, we have been ready to hope, was becoming more harsh to the public ear, even among those, who have been educated to a devout belief of the premises, from which it flows. If it be fact, that some degree of doubt is beginning to be entertained among our Calvinistic brethren, as to the justice of consigning infants to perdition, for belonging to the lineage, and possessing the natures, they had no power to refuse; shall the period never arrive, when a similar doubt will be felt, whether adults may, consistently with the rectitude of God, be doomed to the like fate for retaining the inborn dispositions, they had no power to change? It has afforded us some faint encouragement to find a number of orthodox doctrines stated, in the writings of their modern advocates, in terms as modified and unexceptionable as could be chosen. Edwards used to affirm that "all natural men's affections are governed by malice against God; and that they hate him worse than they do the devil." But though similar language has been heard from Calvinistic pulpits, even at the present day, the best received definition of total depravity, at this time, is *natural destitution of holiness*; a representation of our natures considerably meliorated in expression, and which, taken by itself, would require

little sacrifice of reason for its reception. For all must acknowledge, that holiness, considered as including religious knowledge and principle, is not an inborn, but an acquired quality; and of course we are as naturally destitute of it, as we are destitute by nature of any attainments whatever. But we well know, that those, who adopt this definition of total depravity, are far from intending to place man's natural destitution of holiness on the same footing with his natural destitution of other things, which can only be acquired. They mean by it a moral deficiency resulting from the very nature of the heart; and incurable, except by a grace, which is confined, as they say, to an elected few of our miserable species.

Calvin, and the older writers of his class, were wont to represent the death of Christ, as propitiating the Deity, and reconciling him to men. In one place he remarks, "Christ expiated by his own blood those sins, which made us hateful to God: and, he being our Intercessor, God became placable to us: (*iram ejus fuisse placatam*)."

But says a late orthodox writer, "The sacrifice of Christ was never deemed by any, who did not wish to calumniate the doctrine of atonement, to have made God placable; but merely viewed as the means appointed by divine wisdom, by which to bestow forgiveness." [Magee.]

The same author remarks, that "to the question, in what way does the death of Christ operate to the remission of sins, *every christian* will answer, 'I know not, nor does it concern me to know. It is enough, that this is declared by God to be the medium, through which my salvation is effected.'" It is unnecessary to say how far *they* are from confining themselves to this answer, who speak of "the flaming sword of divine wrath being extinguished in the blood of the Lamb;" and who reason, that Christ must have been God, in order to give an infinite worth to his vicarious sufferings, endured under the infinite wrath of God to expiate an infinite sin; though, while they deny that the divine nature of the Redeemer suffered, they leave it obscure why the pains of a sufferer, inferior to God, might not have been sufficient. If, according to Dr. Magee, "*every Christian* will say, that he does not know, nor does it concern him to know, how the death of Christ operates to the remission of sin;" we trust the more ingenuous part of his orthodox brethren, will not so insist upon our receiving their explanation of the atonement, as to require us to own, that our Saviour needed equality with the Father to give infinite worth to the sufferings, in which his human nature only was concerned. Such good men as the Divine we have just quoted, we cannot doubt, will in time succeed in persuading them, that they do not know how the death of Christ operates to the re-

mission of sin ; if it be only by convincing them of the confusion, which has thus far attended their speculations on the subject.

The foregoing reflections, were particularly suggested to our minds by a discourse of the Rev. Lyman Beecher, which we remember to have seen about a year ago, and have recently run over again with some little attention. It was preached in Park Street, Boston, at the ordination of Mr. Dwight ; and, as we do not recollect to have seen any notice of it in the *Christian Disciple*, or any similar work, we feel the more freedom in adverting to it, notwithstanding the period of its publication. Mr. Beecher is an orthodox divine of considerable eminence. He informs us, that "direct irresistible impulse moving the mind to action would not be moral government." He means, we conceive, direct irresistible impulse, without the intervention of motives. "Moral government is persuasion," he adds, "and the result of it, is voluntary action in the view of motives." "Free agency," he remarks, "cannot be conceived to exist in any other manner, than by the exhibition of motives to voluntary agents, the result of which shall be choice and action." Truly happy we are, that so just a representation of the essential nature of moral government and free agency, should proceed from the pen of an orthodox divine. We hope that the next edition of Griffin's *Lectures* may be corrected by Mr. Beecher. Dr. Griffin affirms, that "the heart is new, before the motives to holiness enter, and that motives must find the disposition already prepared to favour them, before they can act upon the mind ; and again, that the heart must be forced by an act of divine power, as a king forcibly reduces his rebellious subjects, before it is prepared for motives." But, says Mr. Beecher, moral government is government by motives, without direct irresistible impulse ; and free agency cannot be conceived to exist in any other manner, than by the exhibition of motives to voluntary agents. Consequently, unless he essentially dissent from his orthodox brother on the subject of regeneration, he must acknowledge that men are not treated as free agents, nor as under moral government, in the renewing of their affections ; this being produced forcibly, says the reverend lecturer, before motives have *entered* the mind or can operate upon it. But if moral government be suspended, and free agency cease, with regard to the great end of moral government and the only blessing of free agency, the attainment of that holiness of heart which alone has the promise of everlasting life, why do Calvinistic divines make such vehement protestations of their holding to such government and agency ?

“Without the aid of reason,” says Mr. B. “the bible could not be known to be the will of God ; and reason,” he adds, “is the judge of its meaning, according to the common rules of exposition.” We sorely could not wish for a more explicit disavowal of the sentiment, which is embraced by too many of his brethren, that the bible is not to be read like other books. He, at least, it may be presumed, will insist on their rendering some better *reason* of the hope that is in them, than is contained in the reply we are accustomed to hear from them ; that “reason cannot discover the doctrines of grace, by perusing the scriptures, as ordinary writings are perused ; and that so far as these doctrines are concerned, no unholy man can ever rise from the study of the sacred page, even speculatively the wiser.”

“The appropriate meaning of the word reasonable,” says Mr. B. “in its application to the laws of God, is the accordance of his laws and administration with what it is proper for God to do, in order to display his glory to created minds, and secure from everlasting to everlasting the greatest amount of created good. But who is competent,” he asks, “with finite mind and depraved heart to test the revealed laws and administration of Jehovah by this rule ? Reason must ascend the throne of God, and from that high eminence dart its vision through eternity, and pervade with steadfast view immensity, to decide whether the precepts and doctrines contained in the bible come in their proper place, and are wise and good in their connexion with the whole.” Would that such sentiments were more attended to by those, who building their system of theology upon their own view of what the illustration of divine glory requires, affirm, that sin and misery were designed to afford opportunity for the display of God’s vindictive justice ; and that, consistently with his glory and the best good of the universe, God could not, without becoming incarnate, and offering an infinite atonement for sin in the person of his Son, have granted pardon to penitent man ; in a word, who soar so boldly into the regions of metaphysical divinity, as not only to mount above that knowledge of the Deity, which is commonly apprehended by reason, and which is every where disclosed to ordinary eyes, but too often to lose sight of it. We would even recommend to Mr. Beecher himself, to give additional force to the sentiments he has expressed upon this subject, by revising those parts of his sermon, in which he labours to shew, by reasons somewhat too subtle for our apprehension, that the doctrines and precepts of the bible “*do come in their proper place, and are wise and good in their connexions.*” To evince the necessity of scriptural doctrines, as he understands them, to the *moral influence of*

divine legislation, is the leading design of his discourse. "The above truths," he observes, referring to the doctrine of eternal punishment and some others, "are essential to the moral influence of legislation generally." He finds in the nature of the human mind a rational test, by which, *a priori*, to determine what the doctrines of the scripture must be to render them promotive of evangelical affections. "To secure evangelical affections," he remarks, "the following truths are as essential, according to the nature of the human mind, as fire is essential to heat, or any natural cause to its appropriate effect : to wit, the doctrines of the Trinity, the atonement, total depravity, &c. The entire unholiness of the human heart is necessary," he says, "to beget just conceptions of guilt and danger; the doctrine of the Trinity, as disclosing a Saviour able to save," &c. Some may be ready to question the consistency of our reverend author in professing to have discovered *from the nature of the human mind*, that the doctrines of the bible, as he apprehends them, are essential to the moral influence of legislation in the production of evangelical affections, when a few pages back he has declared, that "reason must ascend the throne of God to decide, whether the precepts and doctrines contained in the bible come in their proper place and are wise and good in their connexion with the whole." He himself, it appears, has ascertained from the nature of the human mind, that the doctrines attributed to the word of God by Calvinists and Trinitarians *do come in their proper place*, and are wise and good in their connexion with this part of the universe; are essential to the production of evangelical affections and to the moral influence of legislation generally. If, after his strong and unqualified declaration of the impossibility of ascertaining, whether the precepts and doctrines of the bible are fully worthy of God, he perceives no impropriety in arguing thus *from the nature of the human mind*, it may be hoped, he will in future be willing to indulge a similar privilege to others. If he should, we trust that many, even of his own party, would say, that, judging by their reason merely according to the nature of the human mind, it would appear necessary to the moral influence of divine legislation, that men should be dealt with in a moral way; should be drawn by motives; and not be left dead and insensible by nature to the influence of motives, till by an act of Almighty power, with which a few only are favoured, they are made capable of feeling them. If we might settle our creeds by his rule, that "those doctrines are fundamental, without which the evangelical affections can have no" rational "being;" we should hesitate, whether the doctrine of man's being consigned to everlast-

ing misery for a native inborn depravity, curable only by an act of Almighty power, never exerted in his favour, should be admitted, for its fitness to inspire an ingenuous and supreme respect and affection for the equity and goodness of God. Neither should we be clear, that this doctrine ought to be inserted, for its tendency to produce self-condemnation in the sinner's breast. That many, who are self-condemned for their sins, are thorough believers in total depravity, we do not doubt; but that their remorse proceeds from a sense of natural impotency to think a good thought or exercise a good disposition, and not from that voice of conscience upbraiding them for their actual transgressions, which regards no creeds of man's invention, is not so certain to our minds. On the whole, we must thank Mr. Beecher for furnishing us a test of fundamental doctrines, so favourable to rational Christianity, as that of their adaptation, according to the nature of the human mind, to promote good feelings and the moral influence of divine legislation.

But we are more than suspicious that a test of this description was far from being proposed by him, with a view to exhibit the sentiments of his opponents in their most favourable light; on the other hand, it is painful to discover how much his discourse is adapted throughout to strengthen the prejudices, which many entertain against the Christians, who are not of his way of thinking. It is manifestly aimed, not at distant, solitary, or insignificant heretics, but at the great body of Unitarians and Anti-Calvinists, the usual objects of orthodox attack; with whose sentiments too many of his readers and hearers would not have wanted prejudice, we fear, to identify the wildest errors and absurdities, though he had been less distinct in indicating them to be the persons for whom his animadversions were intended. We are grieved, therefore, to see he has employed so large a portion of his performance in combating opinions, than which none could be more unlike those of his opponents in general. "It is *often* alleged," says Mr. B., "that there are so many opinions concerning the doctrine of the bible, that no man can know his own belief to be the true belief; and on the ground of this supposed inevitable uncertainty, is grounded the plea of universal charity and liberality. But who is this," he demands, "that libels his Maker, as the author of an obscure and useless system of legislation, which no subject can understand; so obscure, that they, who discard it, are little incommoded by the loss?" True, we would ask, who are they, who plead for charity on the ground he mentions? He intimates, they are a numerous class. But assuredly they are not the great body of those in this country, who are opposed to himself in sentiment. How can he believe, that their argument for charity is

founded on an alleged obscurity in the bible, so great as to render the scripture useless, and unintelligible to those, who read it? How could he deny, that they have arrived at a knowledge of the sacred writings satisfactory to their own minds; and that they believe similar satisfaction may be attained by all, who study the word of God with candour and diligence? How can it be his opinion, that they are charitable to others, only because unsettled themselves; and not because they consider it agreeable to the spirit and precepts of Christianity to attribute the errors of their brethren to pardonable ignorance, bias, and mistake, when to such causes they may be reasonably assigned; and to exclude none from the fold of Christ, who offer encouraging evidence of embracing essential truths so far, as is necessary for their salvation? We are but too sensible how wide the opinion has spread, that the charity of liberal Christians is of the kind he describes. But it is of a very different description. They may, it is true, class a number of religious debates among the doubtful disputations, which had better be dropped. But that they profess to see nothing clear and settled in the bible to fit it to be an useful system of legislation, or render it a blessing to its possessor, is a charge, which it might beforehand be difficult to suppose could be found upon record.

Another error, against which the zeal of Mr. Beecher is directed with great success, is the "maxim, that it is no matter what a man believes, provided his life be correct; no matter whether he believe or disbelieve in the divine existence, whether he love or hate the Lord; whether he repent of his sins or remain incorrigible; whether his motives be good or bad; if the mere motion of his lip or hand or foot be according to rule all is well." In confuting this miserable error he employs four of the most glowing pages of his discourse; and, not to consider him as designing simply to gratify us with a display of his argumentative skill, but as seriously intimating, that it is an error embraced by persons sufficient in number and importance to be worthy of notice; we are led to inquire, where does he find a class of this description, who would say, it could be immaterial under any circumstances whatever, whether a man believe or deny the existence of a God; whether he be penitent or impenitent; whether he be actuated by good or bad motives? Is it within the limits of possibility that any human being, however weak or ignorant, can fancy that he has found them in the great body of Unitarians and Anti-Calvinists? Who can suppose, that Mr. Beecher believes it to be the opinion of his opponents or of any person living, that any outward mechanical deportment, may constitute a person

religious and good, while accompanied with Atheism, impenitency, and bad motives?

"It is the opinion of some," he goes on to observe, "that the obvious meaning of the (sacred) texts, according to the established rules of expounding other books, is not to be regarded." We can only say, that though we know full well how many would be ready to think liberal Christians liable to the charge of violating the received laws of interpretation in their explanations of scripture, we were very little prepared to hear of *them*, that they openly *profess* to construe the bible without regard to these laws.

"Of the doctrines of the Trinity, total depravity, &c.," he observes, "that these doctrines are fundamental is evident from the violence, with which they have always been assailed. One," he adds, "denies the being of the lawgiver; another discards the statute book; a third subjects the laws of Jehovah to the censorship of reason, till he can believe without humility, obey without self denial, and disobey without fear of punishment. All representations of the character of man, at variance with the scripture account of his entire depravity, have for their OBJECT the evasion of the precept or penalty of the law. Faith, in the system of such persons, is intellectual assent to revealed truth without holiness. Those, who discard the doctrine of the Trinity, discard usually every other fundamental doctrine with it." These, and a multitude of similar passages toward the close of his discourse, sufficiently indicate, that it was not his design to leave it doubtful, what heretics he had in view. As concerned for the honour of the clerical profession, we regret that such sermons should be delivered; though we cannot doubt what the nature of that re-action will be, when the discovery shall be fully made, that persons may go the length of discarding the doctrine of total depravity, and even believing in the entire unity of the Godhead, without "rejecting every fundamental doctrine of the scriptures;" without "libelling their Maker, as the author of an obscure and useless system of legislation;" without "proposing it as their *object* to evade the precept or penalty of the law;" and without "deeming it immaterial, in any possible case, whether men believe or disbelieve the existence of God; be penitent or impenitent; be actuated by good or bad motives."

P. A.

ON THE LOVE OF THE WORLD.

THE language of the gospel concerning the Love of the World is very strong. It pointedly and decidedly condemns it, as unworthy a place in the Christian's heart. It denounces it as the hinderer at least, and finally the destroyer of true piety. If any man love the world, says the Apostle, the love of the Father is not in him. These two affections are inconsistent with each other; they cannot dwell together in the same soul. But one of them is the first and great commandment, which if we keep not, we want the essence of our religion. Therefore, the only thing to be decided is, what is the nature of these opposing principles; when we have determined this, we have only to govern ourselves accordingly.

There is an assertion of Paul apparently coincident with that above quoted from John. *The carnal mind is enmity against God*;—i. e. the sensual mind, the mind devoted to sensual things, is enmity against God; *for*, adds the Apostle, *it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be*. Hence, the being *subject to God's law*, is a sign of love to him. "The mind, subject to sensual things, *cannot*, at the same time, be subject to the law of God, and therefore is enmity against God." Consequently, the mind *not* subject to sensual things, *may be* subject to the law of God, and therefore love him. Thus subjection to God's law is love to God. So says our Saviour; Then are ye my friends if ye keep my commandments. So says John: this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments.

If this, then, be the definition of the love of God, *that we keep his commandments*; the question arises, What are his commandments? By careless attention to this language we might be misled. The term *commandments* carries our mind to the ten precepts of the Jewish law—the code of external morals; and we turn away at this explanation of the love of God, imagining it a very simple thing, and satisfied that we are in no danger of failing to answer all its demands. But a little serious consideration of the nature of our religion and our connexion with a future state, must convince us, that this view is deficient. The term *commandment* must by no means be understood to exclude the regulation of the inner man, the control of the thoughts, the purifying of the affections, the watching over the motives, the lifting up of the heart, the feeling, affectionate, devoted heart, to that excellent Being. All this, so far from being excluded, is certainly included, because it is all part of the commandment. Christianity is a religion of the af-

sections; it lays its first restraint on the affections; and it maintains its influence over the whole man by means of the control it exercises there. We, therefore, in vain strive to escape the obligations of an internal, spiritual religion, by taking up this definition of the love of God.

Indeed, it is possible to keep all the commandments of external duty, which some are so ready to suppose the whole love of God, without any reference to his authority, without the design of obeying him, without being influenced in any proper sense by the knowledge of his existence. There are men, from all whose calculations the Deity is excluded; in all whose plans, praise-worthy as they may be, his will is unconsulted. They may not oppose his will, because it coincides with their own inclination; yet they would not hesitate to oppose it, if it thwarted their inclinations. It cannot, therefore, be said that the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts. This must be something in the motive, something which influences the will; a principle within, which pervades the affections and is the living spring of all the character.

It is with such a spirit as this, that the love of the world is irreconcilable; by which appears to be intended, in one word, *worldly mindedness*. By the love of God is meant such an affection as makes a reference to him the ruling principle and motive. Consequently by love to the world can be meant, nothing less, than that devotedness to the world, which makes a reference to *it* the ruling principle and motive; that is, nothing less than worldly mindedness.

For it cannot be pretended that *every degree* of attachment to the world, is inconsistent with the love of God, or true piety, and therefore to be avoided as sinful. The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; and a man may be religiously attached to it, as displaying the glory of his Maker. It has been to him the scene of many blessings; and he may therefore love it as part of his Father's house. In the world, too, are included its inhabitants; our parents, children, relatives, friends; and certainly natural affection is not opposed to piety. It is true, there is some very strong prohibitory language on this point. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." But it is universally allowed that such strong expressions cannot be received literally; but must mean precisely what is meant when our Lord says, "He who loveth father or mother *more than me*, is not worthy of me." The affection is not condemned, but the degree of it; extravagant, unreasonable affection. So where his apostle speaks of "lovers of pleasure, more than lovers of God," he im-

plies not the sinfulness of every pleasure, but the wickedness of its excess. So also, the love of the world is condemned, not absolutely, but comparatively; it is condemned because it interferes with the love of God; that is, just so far as it interferes.

The doctrine of indifference to the world, must not be carried to a gloomy and superstitious excess. Certainly neither reason nor religion demand of us to renounce any thing of the world, except its sins; and accordingly our Lord's prayer for his disciples was, "I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from the evil." Indifferent to it we should be, so far as not to place our dependence upon it for happiness, so that we can bear its changes cheerfully, and feel the denial of its pleasures no oppressive evil, and can give up all, and still find that our most valuable possessions are left us. For if mere worldly good is essential to our peace; if our pleasures become dissipation, and unfit us for duty; if our bibles are unopened, our closets unvisited, our hearts unexamined, and our future existence an unwelcome thought; then we love the world too well, and are too much absorbed in things temporal. But we do not love it too well, so long as religious duties are a pleasure, and christian privileges dear to us.

But we are not to be enquiring how near we can go to the borders of the forbidden land, and yet be safe. It is no wisdom to be nourishing the utmost attachment to the world which is allowable. We shall naturally have enough; the real danger is, that we shall have too much; for there is nothing which so easily runs to excess. Our affections will readily enough be set on things below; our duty is to prevent their being absorbed there, and to place them on things above. Let us remember then, that there is an attachment to them wholly incompatible with a religious character. Devotion to the world leaves no room for devotion to God. Worldly mindedness must and will destroy piety. In the nature of things, they are opposed to each other. All sin, of whatever kind it be, has its origin in the undue influence of the world; all temptations spring from the power which present scenes have over the mind; and there is no reason why faith is weak, and piety cold, and virtue irresolute, except this influence of the world. If we were in the midst of things eternal, as we are of things temporal, and they pressed directly upon our senses as these do; then our thoughts would be filled with them, our hearts devoted to them, our lives consecrated to them. Our alienation from them now, is owing to the more importunate presence of sensual things, in many respects more welcome to imperfect beings, which crowd away the objects of faith. This is the

secret of worldly mindedness. Thus it is that piety cannot exist in its company. If you open your bosom to it, it will rush in and fill every corner, and occupy every avenue, so that the love of God can find no place there. The christian cannot look around him without observing melancholy proofs of this, in the lives of men engaged in favourite pursuits, to which religion is an interruption. He cannot look on his own history without recollecting, that, by multiplying his engagements, he has often palsied his religious sensibility, and diminished the influence of his faith. He finds that settled worldly mindedness is the destroyer of religion, and that every degree of worldly mindedness diminishes its power.

How important, therefore, that all our pursuits be mingled with piety, and how wisely has christianity guarded our worldly tendencies, by requiring of us a piety which is not of set times and forms only, but a habit of thought and life, a principle of action. The world is so dangerous, because we are in the midst of it ; it surrounds us ; it presses us on every side ; it urges, entices, and would make us wholly its own. The preventive to this, is constant watchfulness, habitual devotion, and daily recurrence to the great and powerful motives of our faith. When we have our conversation in heaven, the world is not able to lead us astray.

MEEKNESS.

It is a common error to suppose Meekness the gift of nature only ; a grace not to be acquired by effort and discipline. In the estimation of very many, he is the meek man, who is possessed of a quiet good nature which came to him at his birth, and is maintained without any exercise of the will on his part ; who is always still and acquiescing, because he cannot be otherwise ; and is never ruffled by passion, because he has no passions. Now undoubtedly this is a meek man ; and, however the world may ridicule him as pusillanimous, his disposition is, in many respects, a desirable one. But it is certainly a mistake to consider such a one alone as meek, to give such only the praise of this virtue, which stands so high on the list of the gospel ; when it is so entirely constitutional that it costs him nothing to maintain it, and is incapable by any effort of being increased. The consequence of such a definition must be, to make this quality contemptible in the eyes of men, and set the christian temper below the false spirit which the pride of the world cherishes. Certainly, that virtue, whatever it may be, is

most honourable and praiseworthy, which has been acquired by toilsome discipline, and preserved by unremitted exertion. And yet it happens, that the man who has laboured with toil, anxiety, self-denial, to subdue the headstrong passions which nature has given him ; who has wept, and watched, and prayed, that he might get the mastery of his own spirit, and build up the temper of Christ on the ruins of his original violence and pride ; even although he has struggled with success, and has become able to restrain his irritability and impetuosity, and religiously keep silence where he once would have cursed ; this man would yet be refused by many the title of meekness.

But is it reasonable ? Is there any merit greater than that of self-victory ? Is there any nobler triumph of christian principle, than that over the stubbornness of the will, and the ferocity of passion ? Can any one deserve better the name of christian, than he who has fought and conquered to obtain it ? Or is a virtue the less his own, because he is obliged to set a perpetual guard over it ? Perhaps there is sometimes an evident struggle to preserve it ; you discern a little of the workings of his former self ; you see him sometimes struggling to quell the spirit, which attempts again to rise within him in rebellion against the spirit of the gospel. But this marks his *fidelity* ; it is unjust to deny him on account of it, the credit of possessing what he so vigilantly defends. The stream which runs through his grounds would burst its banks and inundate all, if he had not dammed it carefully, and did not watch it continually : and because it occasionally breaks a little through the entrenchment, and you see him obliged to watch and repair, will you deny him the praise you give to his neighbour, whose stream flows quietly, and never was turbulent, and never needed restraint ? Let us be more just to the merits of our fellow-men, and call things by their right names.

To say, indeed, that meekness is merely a constitutional thing, would be to say, that God requires of all, a temper of which he has *created* many incapable. This would be absurd and impious. It may undoubtedly be “ put on,” as the apostle expresses it, by any who will go through the necessary discipline ; and although the credit of possessing it may be denied them by men, yet in the sight of God it will be “ an ornament of great price.”

MISCELLANEOUS COLLECTIONS.

TITLES OF OUR LORD.

THE following list of the titles given to Jesus Christ in the New Testament, is worth examining. It is taken from a note to a sermon of Dr. Lant Carpenter.

I believe the following calculation, made by the assistance of Schmid, will be found sufficiently correct, and may assist in leading the reflecting reader to some conclusions, not unfavourable to the Unitarian scheme. In the New Testament our Lord is called *Jesus* upwards of 600 times, principally in the Gospels; *Jesus Christ* or *Christ Jesus*, about 130 times; *Christ* or *the Christ*, about 270 times, principally in the Epistles; *Lord Jesus Christ*, or *Lord Jesus*, or *Jesus Christ our Lord*, &c. upwards of 100 times, but never in the Gospels; *Son of God*, about 20 times; *the Son of God*, about 30 times; *Son* (implying the same thing,) about 40 times; *the Son of Man*, 80 times; *Son of David*, 14 times; *Beloved Son*, 8 times; *Only begotten*, 5 times; *First begotten*, 5 times; *Saviour*, 17 times; *Mediator*, 4 times; *Redeemer*, not once; *Word*, or *Word of God*, 7 times; *God*, or *a God*, once, (John i. 1. see Improved Version and compare John x. 34, 35; on this point however, there is considerable diversity of opinion;*) *the Image of God* (compare 1. Cor. xi. 7.), twice; *the Brightness of God's Glory and express Image of his Person*, (more correctly, *a Ray of his Glory and an Impression of his Perfections*), once; *Lord of all* (i. e. of Jews and Gentiles Acts x. 36,) once; *Lord of the dead and of the living*, once; *Lord of the sabbath*, once; *Lord of Glory*, twice; *Alpha and Omega*, once, (see Griesbach on Rev. i. 11;) *King of Kings and Lord of Lords*, twice; *Prince of Life*, *Prince*, *Captain of Salvation*, *Author and Finisher of our Faith*, once each, (the original translated Prince, Captain, Author, signifies a Leader or Chief;) *the Life* and *the Light*, several times each; *Kurios* (generally translated *Lord* in the Public Version) is applied to Jesus in so many instances, and with so much diversity of signification, that it is almost impracticable to give any general statement respecting it. If any suppose, that since this word is em-

* For a more complete statement on this point, see note to Mr. Channing's Sermon.

ployed in the Septuagint and the New Testament for the Hebrew name Jehovah, therefore Jesus Christ is Jehovah, let them look into Schmid under the word, and examine the passages in which it is employed. When applied to Jesus it may be rendered Lord, Master, Sir, according to the connexion.—I am not certain that my enumeration is complete ; if not, however, it is not through intention.

EICHHORN'S ODE TO THE PROPHETS.

[The following lines are a translation of a copy of Verses, prefixed by Professor Eichhorn to his recent work on the Hebrew Prophets. We offer them to our readers merely as a specimen of the poetical talents of this celebrated man, and of his manner of thinking on a most important subject.]

O ! trusted of th' Omnipotent, I greet you !
 Rest ye at last within your grove of palms ?
 A rest, which Horeb, Zion, Carmel gave not ?
 How do your early times stand debtors to you !
 For laws, religion, morals, sacred hopes,—
 The weal of states, the precepts of the wise :—
 They flowed like blessed fountains from your lips.
 For yours were noble spirits, that soared up
 Beyond the sluggish present, and the dreams
 Of a subjected and a doting people ;
 Above each common joy, each fond illusion ;
 And back and forward saw the light of ages.
 Far onward, far behind, that light was beaming ;
 And your souls felt it like the fire of heaven.
 Long burned the flame in still obscurity,
 Then shone, to light the course of days yet distant.

In holy shades of solitude, you listened
 In rapt obedience to the unearthly voice,
 That at the midnight or the dawning hour
 Stole o'er the heart, and touch'd its finest chords.
 Now softly fell the tones like showers in spring ;
 Now swept like tempests o'er a slumbering world,
 As if the thousand voices of the past,
 And of all after time, were mingling there.

Ye true and pure of soul, again I greet you ;
 Ye harp-strings in the hands of Deity ;
 Interpreters of heaven ; life of the laws ;
 And heralds of events, that yet appeared not :
 O thou of Sinai, who, midst cloud and storm,

Leaving the world and thy dark times beneath thee,
 Didst look upon that splendour, which now spreads
 Its glories round the earth; and on the form
 Of wisdom, deck'd with pomp and bright with wonders!
 Thou, soul of flame, which snatch'd from heaven its fires,
 And from the realm of shades the widow's son!
 Thou, who didst see Jehovah on his throne,
 With all the glittering train that fill'd his temple!
 Ye mournful ones, who sung but to lament,
 And pour'd in tears your gentle hearts away!
 And ye, who, in the evening of the prophets,
 Saw through the twilight dusky forms advance!
 Ye all, who now to happier regions risen,
 Your labours ceased, and every conflict ended,
 Rove through your grove of palms, and taste of rest;
 A rest, which Horeb, Zion, Carmel gave not!

What do I see? who join themselves to these
 So brotherly? The wise of other nations?
 Yes, the select of God through all the world;
 The noble company of Druid sages;
 Pythagoras, and Orpheus, and Plato:
 All, who were e'er the fathers of the people,
 And guardians of the laws; who faithfully
 Bow'd a pure ear to catch the voice of heaven,
 Gave a pure heart to feel its inspiration.

REVIEW.

Memoirs of the late Mrs. Mary Cooper of London; extracted from her Diary and Epistolary Correspondence. By ADAM CLARKE, LL. D. Fourth Edition. London, 1813. 12mo. pp. 260.

To the Christian Philanthropist, who has so much occasion to lament the divisions which have been multiplied among the disciples of the same Lord and Master, and who has observed with grief the fierce dissensions and bitter controversies, which have resulted from differences of theological opinion, and which have so much retarded the proper influence of Christianity, it is consoling to perceive, that these have not been the only effects of the religion of love; but that, under all its various forms and different disguises, it has never ceased to be effectual in purifying the corrupt, strengthening the weak, and guid-

ing the willing in the way of life. There is so much that is clearly and entirely practical in what we are taught in the gospel, that, however some may have misstated and exaggerated the relative importance of certain speculative opinions, no man who pretends to the name of Christian, could fail to inculcate the necessity of a virtuous and holy life. These instructions are not lost amid the tumults of controversy, for they are enforced and brought home to men's bosoms, by the powerful though secret admonitions of natural conscience. Christians therefore, of all denominations, however widely they may differ in opinion, or however directly the religious tenets of some may appear opposite in their natural tendency to practical excellence, have generally been sufficiently instructed in that which constitutes the great requisite to happiness both here and hereafter. And we believe, and we rejoice to believe, that "in every nation, and in every sect, he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him;" that he who has fed the hungry, clothed the naked, visited the sick, and comforted the prisoner, will inherit the kingdom prepared for him from the foundation of the world; that no want of faith in doubtful dogmas will prevent the fulfilment of the promise, that "the pure in heart shall see God;" and that no want of confidence in their acceptance, will exclude the poor in spirit from the kingdom of heaven.

Many are prevented from taking this cheering view of the subject, by that pride of opinion and sectarian zeal, which would confine the path to heaven within such narrow limits, that none can be safe but those who follow their footsteps; while others looking back upon the history of Christianity, and expecting to find peace on earth and good will towards men, are shocked by the fierceness of the angry disputant, the violence of the bigot, and the fury of the persecutor. They have seen the field overrun with rank and noxious weeds, and have concluded in despair, that the thorns have sprung up and choked the good seed. But the history of religious controversy is not the history of religion. The fruits of the spirit are to be sought, not principally in those actions which become subjects of history, but in the narrower sphere of private life. There we may often find christian charity, humility, and piety, appearing in their most attractive forms. There, under the shade of many conflicting opinions and opposing doctrines, we may often discover much that should awaken our gratitude to God, and our benevolence to man. We may be greatly assisted in our charitable inquiries into the religious and moral attainments of those from whom we differ in opinion, by memoirs of sincere and devout Christians, like those of which we are about to speak.

In the *Memoirs* of Mrs. Cooper, we have seen little of the peculiarities of a sectarian, and have been gratified with much that indicates a deep feeling of piety, and an ardent love of all real excellence. She received her early religious education from worthy and pious parents, in the communion of the church of England. It was perhaps a little injudiciously severe, for at the age of sixteen, when she first left her home on a visit, she sought with avidity all the fashionable amusements and pleasures which were within her reach. She was soon, however, convinced that dissipation and frivolity are not happiness; and upon her return to her family, her attention was more deeply awakened than it had ever previously been, to serious subjects. It was not long after this time that she commenced keeping a diary; a practice from which, when discreetly conducted, we think some important benefits may be derived. It is a valuable aid to the memory, and enables us to compare more fairly our past and present character, to determine what we have already accomplished, and what yet remains for us to do, in the pursuit of virtue, and the contest with sin. But in so far as a diary relates to the state of our own minds and hearts, in order to render it of any value, indeed to prevent it from becoming a snare to our virtue, it must not only be kept from the eyes of others, but must be designed solely and entirely for our own improvement. We must watch against allowing ourselves to have any further view, than seriously and religiously to correct what is wrong, and to improve what is right, in our own breasts. Few things can be more pernicious to the writers, and few certainly more offensive to a reader of sincere piety, than those diaries which are sometimes sent into the world, bearing the marks of having been originally intended, with an ill directed benevolence, for the edification of the christian world in general. The existence of that of Mrs. Cooper was unknown even to her husband, until after her decease.

The zeal and industry manifested by this worthy woman in the cultivation of her understanding, well deserves imitation. She regularly pursued the study of some branch of the History of Nature, or the History of man, and derived from it those benefits which might be anticipated. She became more alive to the beauties of creation, more thoroughly and deeply convinced of the perfections of its Almighty author, and more sensible of the necessity of Divine assistance and direction to the imperfect reason of man. It is a vulgar error, not yet entirely exploded, that knowledge and piety are in some degree at variance; we were therefore pleased to see the following remarks from the pen of one whose piety is unquestionable, and whose character will give weight to her opinions in the estima-

tion of those to whom her suggestions are calculated to be useful.

“The cultivation of my understanding has long been my aim and desire ; and the time usually devoted by those of my own age and sex, to pleasure and frivolity, has been spent in more rational pursuits. The restraints of education were, in the first instance, *imposed* upon me : this yoke I impatiently bore ; but when, by the mercy of God, I was made *sensible* of the vanity of worldly pursuits, and their dangerous tendency ; and, above all, was convinced that I had an immortal soul within me, that an omnipresent Deity was the witness of my actions, the Searcher of my heart and intentions ; I was, I trust, made desirous of choosing God for my portion. Man must have recreations, resources, pleasures ; the improvement of the mind, of the reasoning faculties, appears the noblest and most rational of indulgencies. Knowledge has been so captivating to my imagination, that I have with eagerness snatched every spare moment for its attainment. While endeavouring to scan the great arcana of nature ; to trace the finger of the Deity in every production ; to mark His obvious *designs* in every creature of His hand ; with what a double relish have I viewed the works of the great Creator ; how has my heart glowed with joy in exploring these fields of novelty and information ; nothing so much tends to exalt our ideas of God ; nothing is so calculated to produce humility ; nature is open for our perusal, and, by its beauties, alluring to the observer. How powerfully does the immensity of the great Creator strike the soul, when contemplating the starry hosts ; when, wrapt in astonishment, the spirit rises to the stars, and views them as the creation of its Father’s hand ! O ! endearing title ; though He dwells in the highest heavens, He has also His residence in the humble and contrite heart ; which is as much the object of His care as if it alone existed.

“When dissolving nature shall proclaim that the hour of retribution is at hand ; when the rocks and mountains shall prove a vain defence against the piercing eye of the avenging Deity, O that I may hail the moment as the time of my complete happiness, when soul and body, once more united, shall rise to eternal happiness ! Why do I ever linger in pursuit of such a prize ? It is my desire to have a greater acquaintance with God and His works, and more humbling views of myself. I wish to strive against every appearance of *vanity, conceit, and self-sufficiency*. Knowledge, without wisdom, puffeth up : I would, in this respect, *watch* my heart.” p. 23—25.

In the year 1809, Mrs. Cooper, then Miss Hanson, became acquainted with some of the Wesleyan, or Arminian Methodists, who reckon among their number some distinguished names, such for instance as that of Dr. Clarke, the editor of the little work before us. She was charmed with their zeal, the strictness of their lives, and what she considered their scriptural views of religion, and soon enrolled herself as one of that denomination. From this period, she continued with fresh vigour, her pursuit of the christian acquisitions of holiness and piety. Her views and feelings were in many respects different from our own ; but we have little to object to that religion, of which the direct and natural tendency is exhibited in the improvement of the heart and life, and are not disposed to quarrel with opinions which do not create exclusive pretensions, nor

uncharitable and censorious dispositions towards those who consider them as erroneous. We make the following extracts from her diary and letters, that we may give the reader an idea at once of the manner in which she aimed at self-improvement, of the practical nature of her ardent piety, and of her liberal feelings and principles with respect to sincere Christians of other denominations.

"I feel daily more and more the need of watchfulness and the influence of the Spirit to keep alive my good desires and resolutions; for I know my heart is deceitful, and the world alluring.—Experience has shewn me, that one great cause of religious declension is a carelessness in devotion, and neglect of reading the Scriptures; hence I would have *set* seasons for both, and conscientiously observe them. * * * The worldly are very *eager* in the pursuit of their pleasures, pleasures which produce satiety—shall I then, who am a probationer for heavenly pleasures, be *slow* in seeking them—and shall I suffer every little trifle to rob me of them? O forbid it! It is not an earthly shadow, but an eternal substance, I seek after. It demands my constant attention, my most fervent devotions."

"Let not the universal carelessness which prevails about unseen things, *deter me*. Our Lord foretold this; he says, the gate is straight, and but few *enter it*; but He also forewarns me of that place where the worm never dies.

"I do record it, on this anniversary of my birth, that I desire, more devotedly than I ever have done, to give myself up, all I have and am, to my God; to press forward in the Divine life, and to aim at that perfection which is the glory and happiness of the saints. These are my birth-day hopes and resolutions; and my handwriting will witness against me if I swerve from these paths of religion and peace.

"I hope I have gained something, from observation, the past year. I live but to little purpose if experience do not teach me; and if the commission of error in one instance do not deter me from the same, when a similar occasion offers."

"May the succeeding year, if I live to complete it, find me more decidedly devoted to God; less earthly-minded, and abounding more in good works. *Mark this*, religion is a progressive work, no standing still; either on the *advance* or on the *decline*—if it dwells in the soul, it will transform the nature, subdue evil, and be gradually assimilating it to the Divine Image.

"All on earth must say to corruption, Thou art my mother, and to the worm, Thou art my sister. Such is our destiny by nature. But thou, my soul, hast higher hopes, and sublimer expectations: thy immortal interests are, through grace, thy chief concern: thou hast been taught by the word of God, that though the outward tabernacle be dissolved, thou hast a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Joyful prospect! Live but in the preparation for this, and death will lose its sting, the grave its terrors, and the world its charms. Well then, be not cast down; all on earth is changeable: there is no rest here: thou hast proved its insufficiency to impart one moment's real solid satisfaction. But God is unchangeable; His arms of mercy are ever open to receive those who seek Him; His promises are as eternal as His nature. The only wisdom is to seek God, and to prepare to meet Him. Remember, O my soul, that every day thou art called upon to remember thy God, to seek His favour, and to *begin* here that employ which is the bliss of angels and glorified spirits. Religion, if it exists in the soul, must subdue sin; it must be manifested in every action of the life; tempers must be sanctified, holy

dispositions implanted. These are the evidences of a state of grace; it is this which makes the soul easy under all the afflictions of life. This is the blessed union which subsists between Christ and His people; these are the evidences of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which can make the Christian joyous, happy, and even triumphant, in the anticipation of death."

"The inestimable blessing of Divine illumination, the gift of the Holy Spirit, is only promised to those that seek it. Perseverance is needful; and when the infinite value of this gift is considered, surely the soul should possess itself with patience and diligent seeking till the Divine breathing be communicated. I have always found the blessings of grace dispensed to me in proportion to my diligence in seeking them. Much profit I have found by *stated seasons* of devotion, and devotional reading. This is, indeed, great encouragement for me most diligently and importunately to seek that sense of God's pardoning mercy which shall diffuse the peace which passeth understanding.

"My confidence in God is greatly strengthened. The world has lost all its charms for me; and 'the pearl of great price' is what I most desire to possess:—to keep my heart with all diligence, to watch the first risings of sin, and to fear the quenching of the Holy Spirit—this be now my care and business. Religion demands my time, my talents, and my affections; and I bless God I have no desire to make any reserve. I desire to be wholly the Lord's; and to prove it by holiness in all manner of conversation. I must indeed daily pray and strive against pride, and warmth of temper: the first manifests itself when my favourite opinions are opposed. Here, indeed, a strict watch is necessary. I must avoid controversy in religion; and remember that acrimony and taking offence are great proofs that piety has not its due influence on the heart.

"While we continue in the grace of God freely imparted, watching and praying, loving God with all our hearts, none shall pluck us out of the Redeemer's hands; nothing shall separate us from His love. But if we grow careless, neglectful of prayer and reading the word of God; count His service weariness, and hold communion with the world instead of the Creator, can you think such persons meet for the kingdom of heaven! These instances, my dearest friend, are not uncommon. I do believe that if you and I have once received the grace of God, it is our own fault, and chargeable alone upon ourselves, that we ever lose it. God deals with us as with reasonable creatures; and certain conditions are prescribed to us. We are to ask, seek, and knock for the Holy Spirit: having received it, we are to *watch* and pray, deny ourselves, abstain from all appearance of evil: the power is from above; and through Christ we can do all these things.

"Do not let these sentiments and enjoyments, if contrary to your own, diminish the love you have borne me; mine for you glows with the same fervour; and I shall have just reason to reproach myself, if I suffer the entrance of indifference. *All* will meet in heaven who love God, by whatever name they are called: the more we get of this Divine principle, the more we shall love each other."

These are feelings which we sincerely wish were more generally prevalent. They are the genuine results of real piety, the best demonstrations of christian charity. The errors of Mrs. Cooper were those of the understanding, and not of the heart; and while we would caution others against them, we would still more eagerly lift up a warning voice against that uncharitable-

ness, which would neglect or despise what is excellent, because united with something that is weak or mistaken.

We regret that the editor has not given us a more particular account of her social life, as we conceive that the example of a Christian who so well understood the nature of holiness, and the means of improvement in all virtue, would have been particularly useful; we, however, cordially agree with him in the opinion, that "it may be safely presumed, that no unprejudiced person can peruse this little volume, without having his heart religiously affected, and his mind considerably improved."

ARTICLE XI.

God not the Author of Sin. A Discourse delivered before the Second Congregational Church and Society in Marblehead, June 20, 1819. By JOHN BARTLETT, Pastor of said Church.

CERTAIN theological opinions are still popular among us, which seem, at least, to represent God as the author of sin in a sense incompatible with his justice, goodness and mercy. It is the object of this discourse to vindicate the divine character from any such imputation; and to shew that those theological opinions in which any such imputation is expressed or implied are and must be irrational, unscriptural, and therefore false. The passage of scripture which Mr. Bartlett has selected for his text, is from Isaiah v. 4. "*What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?*" After a short and pertinent introduction he proceeds.

"The passage we have selected we think authorises the following general position, and the inference which is drawn from it, viz.

"I. That God has done every thing which an infinitely wise, holy, just and good Being could do, consistently with his moral perfections and with our freedom of agency, to prevent our sin and misery, and to make us holy and happy. Therefore,

"II. Any sentiment which either directly or by implication, makes our sins to appear necessary as the effect of divine appointment; or inevitable as the consequence of any constituted inability, or through the want of sufficient means to prevent them, cannot be correct and is not taught in the Bible." p. 4.

His main position he afterwards goes on to establish, in a style of great perspicuity and directness,

“ by arguments drawn from the nature of God, which is essentially opposed to sin; from the nature which he has given to men, by which they are made capable of moral excellence, and furnished with a defence against sin; from the laws which he hath prescribed to us, inculcating holiness and prohibiting sin, and enforced by the most solemn sanctions; from the connexion which he has established between sin and misery even in this world; from the wonderful fact that he has sent his only begotten and dearly beloved Son into the world on purpose to redeem men from sin; and bestowed his Holy Spirit, all whose operations oppose sin, and whose office is to purify the soul.”

“ To these arguments might be added others, drawn from the declarations of God's word, and from the methods of his providential government of the world; but what has already been offered we think sufficient to convince any reasonable man, whose mind is not warped by system nor fettered by prejudice, that God cannot be the author of sin; but has done and is doing every thing which a wise, holy, just and good Being can consistently do to prevent it.” p. 9.

Why then has he not actually prevented it? If God could prevent sin, but would not, where is his goodness? and if he would prevent sin, but could not, where is his power? These difficulties the writer of this discourse has not thought proper to attempt to solve. To account for the origin and existence of sin in God's moral creation he seems to suppose impossible, and assigns this as a reason for not pursuing the inquiry any further. His object is not to establish any theory of his own on this dark subject; but to refute one already established. We apprehend, however, that he has not thought sufficiently on the extreme difficulty, may we not say the impossibility of persuading men to give up any theory which they have for a long time regarded as true, unless another theory is offered them in its room equally plausible and not liable to the same objections. Men like to *account for things*; they do not care so much upon what system, but they will have *some* system. What they account for in one way to-day, you may persuade them to account for in a better way to-morrow; but you will not succeed in persuading them that it cannot be accounted for at all. Men love to have a theory for every thing, though, as we before remarked, they do not care much what it is, if it do but answer its purpose. The only way therefore, in which we can hope to dislodge an erroneous theory from their minds, is to supplant it with the true one, which may fill the place, or at least answer for the absence of the one that is put away.

Since then the difficulties under consideration are such as will be likely to influence our views of God's character and providence, accordingly as we account for them; and since they are difficulties on which men will speculate, notwithstanding whatever may be said to dissuade them from doing it; we think it adviseable to go a little deeper into the subject, and

make a few suggestions that may lead them to conclusions, not free perhaps from all objections and cavils, but liable certainly to fewer than those which they now may hold. The investigation we well know is, above all others, intricate and perplexing—but since men will plunge into the labyrinth, there is so much the more reason that some clue should be given to guide them through its mazy windings. The dryness of the subject shall not drive us from our purpose, though it may our readers; not that we intend to give the subject a full discussion, but only to offer a very few remarks illustrative of those commanding points on which, as we believe, the whole controversy turns.

Dr. Hartley has observed with his accustomed sagacity, that in regard to the introduction of sin into God's world, most of the confusion and inconsistency in the minds and writings of men, has arisen from their mixing together the popular language with philosophical language. It must be a fact familiar to all acquainted with metaphysicks, that there are two methods of speaking upon a variety of subjects—the one popular—the other philosophical—the former representing things as they appear to be; and the latter as they really are. Thus, in popular language, we say there is fragrance in the rose, flavour in the peach, and colour in the plum: and this, considered as popular language, is true—true in the sense in which it is understood—true enough to answer all the purposes of common conversation. But considered as philosophical language, it is not true; for fragrance, flavour, and colour are not and cannot be qualities of external bodies—but only sensations of the mind. We see therefore that the popular mode of speaking and the philosophical are often at variance. We may use either, and be clear, and consistent, and sufficiently accurate so long as we keep it distinct from the other: but if we mix and confound them together, we shall be led to endless confusion and paradox. It is from this abuse of language that we often hear such silly paradoxes as the following, gravely announced by men who have just gotten a smattering of modern philosophy. "There is no more heat in fire than in ice." Heat in popular language we use to signify not only the sensation of heat in the mind, but also the quality in the external body that produces that sensation. Understanding, therefore, this term, in the expression quoted, in a popular sense, in which it ought to be understood from its connexion—the assertion is not true. But limiting the term heat to its philosophical acceptation—by which it is made to signify only the sensation of heat in the mind—there to be sure it is true. Thus it is that by mixing and confounding popular language with philosophical, we can make

numberless imaginary paradoxes, which can be so explained as to appear true, but which, by being so explained, become at the same time idle and unmeaning.

We apprehend that most of the difficulties and metaphysical abstrusities that have embarrassed our speculations on the origin of moral evil, have arisen from our allowing ourselves to be cheated and fooled by paradoxes, like the one we have just mentioned. When men directly affirm that God is the author of sin, or, *which is the same thing*—when they maintain doctrines that either amount to or imply the affirmation that God is the author of sin; they give to the terms used a meaning very different from their popular acceptance. Though therefore, they may be able to support and vindicate their doctrines in the sense in which they say they mean them to be understood—they by no means support and vindicate them in the sense in which they would probably be, and are, in fact, generally understood. They do not prove by all their long and laboured argumentation any thing more, than what a man of plain good sense would readily concede to them without any argumentation at all. They prove that what they *mean* by their doctrines is true, by proving that they do not mean any thing by them; that is, any thing different from what others believe, who would express their faith in very different language. Many of their doctrines we conceive to be like the paradoxes we have alluded to above, a mere play upon words. No one we should think could fail of being struck with the correctness of this remark, in reading the works of that very acute and ingenious metaphysician, President Edwards.

Without doing any great violence to language, no doubt there is *a sense* in which God may be said to be the author of all our actions. But it is not the popular sense, the common sense, the sense in which such an assertion would be understood by the great mass of the people. In popular language we say that man is the author of his own actions, the agent of his own work. Indeed all human language is founded on this assumption. Who does not say, man runs, man fights, man steals? And we should hardly be able to treat one with a due degree of seriousness, who should gravely tell us that we are all wrong in this; that we must alter our phraseology, and say, God runs, God fights, God steals. In fact if we should make any such alteration, we should in a degree do violence to the nature and defeat the purposes of language. Language is in itself essentially popular, and designed for popular use. Should we therefore endeavour to change its nature and design, we might perhaps be able to puzzle, and unsettle, and confound men's minds, but we should not be able to do any thing more.

We should not be able to elucidate what is dark, or correct what may be erroneous in their understandings.—The fact is, when we say that man is the author of his own actions, we do not mean, and we are not understood as meaning any thing but what is strictly and philosophically true. When the plain country man affirms, and persists in affirming, that there is heat in fire, it is certain, as Dr. Reid has abundantly shewn, that he does not mean that there is any thing like the *sensation* of heat in the fire ; but only that there is *something* in fire which warms those who approach it ; and the philosopher cannot deny this. So also when we say that man is the author of his own actions, we have nothing to do with any metaphysical theory on the subject of his volitions, but we merely mean, and we are understood as merely meaning, that there is something in man on account of which he is to be considered the immediate author of such and such actions. Will the philosopher deny this ? Now if you go to the plain man and contradict him—telling him that there is no heat in fire—he will of course understand you as contradicting what he *means* ; that is, he will understand you as saying, that there is no quality belonging to the fire which causes in our minds the sensation of heat ; so that instead of correcting an error in him, you will, though perhaps unintentionally, lead him into an error. Just so it will be if you represent men as not being the authors of their own actions. So far as they may be able to understand you at all, they will misunderstand you. You will not correct any error in them ; for on your own principles they are not in any error, though they use directly contrary language. All you will do will be to introduce infinite perplexity and confusion into their thoughts on human agency.

What we have said against the propriety of calling God the author of human actions in general, applies with tenfold force against the propriety of calling him the author of our sins ; and therefore against the propriety of *using that sort of language* which would seem to *imply* that he is the author of our sins ; for it is obvious that there is no difference between using that language which inevitably implies it, and openly and directly calling him so. Sin, in popular language, is understood to signify a wrong use of our voluntary powers. To say therefore that God is the author of sin, is to say that he is the author of the wrong use of our *voluntary* powers—which is plainly a solecism. Sin is sin no otherwise, than as it is a wrong use of powers, understood to be strictly voluntary. If our active powers are not strictly and philosophically speaking voluntary, then, strictly and philosophically speaking, there is no such thing as sin. So far as God is the author of our sins, they are not

sins. Evils, it is true, they may be ; but they cannot be called sins. If, in philosophical language we may call God the author of moral evil, then, in order to be consistent, we must continue to use the same philosophical language, and call moral evil, not sin, but only a particular modification of natural evil. It will not do for us in the first place to speak of moral evil in philosophical language, as originating in God, and then in the same connexion to speak of it in popular language, as originating in man. We may use either language alone, and it will answer well enough ; but we must not use them promiscuously ; for, we repeat it, if we do, we shall certainly confuse ourselves, and confound others.

We have said more on this point than we thought would be necessary when we began. But we shall not have lost our labour if we have led any of our readers to reflect, first, that in speculating on human merit and demerit, we use two methods of speaking—two languages ; in which the very same terms are interpreted respectively by different laws and received in different acceptations ; so that a proposition may at the same time be understood as true either affirmatively or negatively, accordingly as it is taken in a popular or philosophical sense. Secondly, that although perhaps no great evil will result from using either mode of speaking, if it be carefully kept distinct from the other, yet if we confound them together, we shall introduce into our thoughts and reasonings paradoxes and self-contradictions without number. And thirdly, that as all language seems in its nature, structure and design, to be entirely popular, we have no right to use it in any other but the popular acceptance, without endeavouring, and being certain that we succeed in our endeavours, to prevent those whom we address from misconstruing on that account what we advance ; that is, the philosopher must not only be sure that there is a sense in which his expressions are true, but he must also be certain they will be received in that sense by the people whose language he uses, and whom he addresses.

Now, in applying these principles to the subject in debate, we are by no means unwilling to admit, that there is a sense in which God may be said to be the author of moral evil ; we are not unwilling to allow that there is a sense in which it may be said, that God foresees, occasions, and if you please did predestinate, its existence. Nay, more ; we will suppose there is a sense in which it may be said God foreknows, expects, and, if you please, makes, such and such particular persons to be vessels of dishonour, children of wrath, workers of iniquity. Still further : so little are we disposed to be quarrelsome, we will

take it for granted that it is only in this sense that those who advocate the doctrines of predestination and election, mean to understand themselves and be understood by others. After making all these concessions, it may be thought that we have brought the controversy to an end by giving it up. Far otherwise. We have still serious, and, as we believe, solid grounds of objection against those who advocate the Calvinistic doctrines of predestination and election. These shall be stated in the sequel; but we must first explain in what sense it is, that God may in truth be said to permit, occasion, or, if you please, predestinate, ordain, or decree the existence of moral evil in general, or in particular instances.

The evil that there is in the world is of three kinds; metaphysical, natural, and moral. *Metaphysical evil* is the evil of defect or imperfection in the nature, adaptation, or contrivance of things. *Natural evil* is that which results from the operation of *unintentional* agents. And *Moral evil* is that which results from the operation of *intentional* agents.

Now we say that all natural and moral evil flows from metaphysical evil—or, in other words, that all evil of every kind either consists in, or can be traced to defect or imperfection in the nature, adaptation, or contrivance of things. That all natural evil may be traced not to design, but to imperfection—not to contrivance, but to defect of contrivance, has been satisfactorily shewn by the inimitable Paley. Much as disorder and suffering of every sort abound in the world, they never appear to exist in and for themselves. There has not been and it is therefore presumed there cannot be found, in the whole compass of nature, any one thing the *purpose* of which is to mar the beauty or disturb the harmony of creation. True it is, there are many things that are continually producing evil; but this never appears to have been the design or end of their being. That in every case appears to be the production of good; and the only reason why they do not produce always good, but sometimes evil, is some imperfection in themselves or their adaptation. It is as if an ingenious man should frame a complicated machine, but should not frame it so exactly but that it would still be liable to some disorders in its operation. In this case it is plain that these disorders are not the effect of design in the contriver of the machine—nor the end of any particular part of it; but they result from the imperfection of the whole. So it is with natural evil in the world.

And so also it is with moral evil. It is not necessary for us to enlarge upon the imperfections of our moral faculties and capacities. Our weakness and ignorance are proverbial; and in childhood, when our habits and propensities are most rapidly

forming, this weakness and ignorance are most remarkable. No species—no, not an instance of moral evil can be named, which cannot be traced to some perversion or misapplication of the principles of our nature. As in the natural world, nothing exists, the *purpose* and *end* of which appear to have been to produce suffering and disorder; so also in the moral world, nothing can be found, the purpose and end of which appear to have been to introduce sin. Sin has found its way into the world not through design, but through imperfection—not through contrivance, but through defect of contrivance. If any one will take the trouble to analyze the passions and affections of man, he will find that not one of them, in its natural state, and in and of its own nature, is the source of moral evil. It is only by their being perverted and misapplied that the agency of our passions and affections becomes pernicious. This has been proved and illustrated in a thousand ways by Dr. Cogan in his *Treatise on the passions*; and to that work we must refer our readers, having no time to dwell on the subject. We can only remark, that there is no more reason to consider the guilt of our souls the result of contrivance and design in our moral constitution, than there is to consider the pain and sickness of our bodies the result of contrivance and design in our physical constitution. Guilty we know we are; but our guilt in every instance originates in our abusing and perverting powers and faculties in themselves good, and which would have produced good had they not been thus abused and perverted. Now to say, that the evil, which springs from the misapplication of our moral powers, was designed in the gift and constitution of those moral powers, is absurd. It is the same thing with saying, that they were designed to be misapplied; which is a solecism in language. Every thing that is made is of course designed to some certain end by its maker. If it be applied to answer another end, the evil which results from this misapplication, though it may be and must be referred to some imperfection either in the thing itself, or its adaptation, cannot in any sense be traced to design in its maker—to design in any thing. It results not from design, but from imperfection—from metaphysical evil.

All evil therefore, whether moral or natural, results from metaphysical evil. Whence then comes metaphysical evil? As all moral and natural originate in metaphysical evil, we may say that the cause of metaphysical evil is the cause of all evil. If therefore, we can account for the existence of that, we at the same time account for the introduction and existence of all evil. Whence then does metaphysical evil arise? Who is

its author? Is it God? Is God the author of the imperfection and defect there is in the natural and moral worlds?

We might answer, No: God is not the author of metaphysical evil, for it has no author. Borrowing our language from Scott's *Christian Life*, we might say,—“God is the cause of perfection only, but not of defect, which, so far forth as it is *natural* to created beings, hath no cause at all, but is merely a negation or non-entity. For every created being was a negation or non-entity before ever it had a positive being, and it had only so much of its primitive negation *taken away* from it as it had positive being conferred upon it; and therefore, so far forth as *it is*, its being is to be attributed to the sovereign cause that produced it; but so far as it *is not*, its not being is to be attributed to the original non-entity out of which it was produced. As for instance, if I give a poor man a hundred pounds, that he is worth *so much* money is wholly owing to me; but that he is not worth a hundred *more*, is owing only to his own poverty; and just so, that I have such and such *perfections* of being, is wholly owing to God who produced me out of nothing; but that I have such and such *defects* of being, is only owing to that non-entity out of which he produced me.”

This does not however perfectly satisfy us. There are certain specific defects and imperfections in this system of things, which we hardly think accounted for by calling them mere non-entities. They are defects and imperfections too, from which flow a multitude of evils, both natural and moral, of far too serious an importance to have *nothing* for their author. They seem essentially to belong to this world, constituted as it now is, and to grow out of its very constitution. The author of this system of things, which we call the world, may be said therefore in one sense to be the author of these imperfections; for if he had not made the world at all, or had not made it just as he has, they would not have existed. In a sense, therefore, he may be called the author of metaphysical evil; and, by consequence, the author of all evil. He does not cause it directly; neither does he do any thing that indirectly *causes* it—but he *occasions* it. It does not arise from what he has done, but from what he has not done. The world does not exist on account of the evil, but the evil exists on account of the world. God is the author of evil only inasmuch as he does not prevent it. This distinction is to be carefully noticed and recollected; for though there is a *sense* in which God is the author of evil, yet it is by no means the *same* sense in which he is the author of good. The good there is in the world results from his having done *so much*, and the

evil from his not having done *more*. Good is the purpose of God *in and for itself*—but in and for itself Evil is not the purpose of God, and only exists as it is essentially connected with the whole scheme of his creation. The good springs from design; the evil is only incidental, not the object of express design, but growing out of the execution of other designs, all of which are good.

After all, however, it may be asked, what is the difference between directly causing or creating evil by design, and merely occasioning it? Does it not amount to the same thing, since in either case evil is originated?—Certainly in popular language, and as we speak in human affairs, there is a vast difference between causing or creating evil by design, and only occasioning it without design—so far at least as it relates to the moral character of the agent. When we induce evil by design, we are held answerable for the evil; but when without designing it, then our moral characters are not thought to be implicated. Now if we apply this principle to God, and speak of him as we do of men, *anthropomorphitically*, as it is called, we do not see but that the distinction will still hold good with regard to him. It is true, God *foresees* not only all the good he will create by design, but also all the evil that will accompany that design though not part of it. In this respect he differs from us; but we do not perceive that this affects in the slightest degree the distinction in question; for the morality of any agent, whether God or man, is not at all determined by his foreseeing or his not foreseeing the consequences of his conduct, but by his *intentions* in pursuing it. As, therefore, we have shewn that evil in the world is not the object of design on the part of the Creator; the divine character for justice and goodness we do not conceive to be at all implicated in its origin; nor do we think its existence furnishes any argument for impeaching divine providence.

Yet may it not still be asked, Why has God left his work so imperfect—why has he permitted metaphysical evil to remain in his creation—why has he not supplied every defect and corrected every imperfection? We answer, he could not. When God gave existence to beings out of himself, it was necessary to make them *limited* in a greater or less degree, or else he must have multiplied himself; which of course was impossible. Now all limitation implies imperfection or defect; and consequently, imperfection or defect in God's creation, that is, metaphysical evil, exists *from necessity*—from a necessity independent of God himself, and in which therefore his character is not concerned.

But it may be said, although metaphysical evil could not be prevented, yet might not its *consequences*—natural and moral evil—have been avoided by general or constant interpositions of providence? And it may be urged in this connexion, that the morality of an agent is often as much affected by what he does or does not *prevent*, as by what he does or does not produce.—In answer to the question which we have supposed to be put to us, we observe, that it is the same thing with asking in other words, could not God make a world different from and better than the world he has made? for allowing the evil of imperfection to continue, it is plain its natural consequences could not be avoided, without disturbing and destroying those laws and connexions which exist among things, and which make this world *what it is*. If then it is asked, whether God could not have made a different and a better world; we reply; suppose that he could; what then? It is to be recollected that though there is evil and much evil in this world, yet good upon the whole predominates over it—and that though we are subject to more or less of misery in our existence, yet no one is justified upon the whole in despising his existence. These positions we take; we presume they will not be disputed; at least we are ready to defend them. Granting therefore that God could have created another and a better world than this—it does not by any means prove it inconsistent with his supposed perfections to create *this* world, since this world is upon the whole good. To say otherwise would be to go upon the presumption, that it is inconsistent with the perfections of God to do any good at all, unless he does the *best* in every particular instance—the best both in degree and in kind; a presumption absurd enough; for among all the possible good things that do or might exist, there is of course only *one* of them which is *best* both in degree and kind; and therefore upon the presumption we have named, there would be only this *one* thing which God could create and repeat consistently with his perfections. This would be to limit at once the opportunities of divine beneficence. No, it is only necessary to shew that this creation is upon the whole good, to make God's producing it altogether consistent with his perfections. That he might have produced other worlds still better than this, is very probable—that he actually has done so, is very possible. But because he can do, and perhaps has done good in other, and it may be in better ways; we are not to think it inconsistent with his wisdom and goodness to have created this world according to its present constitution, in which, though imperfect, good predominates. It is upon the whole good, and therefore there is no just ground for the complaint that it is not *better*.

So much for the origin of evil, and the introduction of sin into God's world. All natural and moral evil spring alike from metaphysical evil. And this metaphysical evil is occasioned or permitted, not in and for itself, but only as it is essentially connected with the whole scheme of his creation; a scheme in which good predominates over evil, particular evil being made to consist with general good, and order and happiness being educed out of confusion and distress. To conclude this part of our subject with the words of Pistorius—"This question of the origin of evil, so important to the peace of mankind and so puzzling to human understanding, may in my opinion be reduced to this; When God gave existence to beings out of himself he must have made them limited, or have multiplied himself; if the latter be an impossibility, we must grant that his goodness and wisdom might produce beings with more or fewer limitations."

Having stated what we conceive to be the origin of evil and sin, we must now fulfil our promise to present certain objections which appear fairly to lie against the manner in which the Calvinists speak on this subject, and on those connected with it. We have acknowledged and we still acknowledge, that there is a *sense* in which God may be said to be the author of sin, since he has so constituted this world, and so placed us in it, that sin has arisen, and he must have expected it. We will even *suppose* that God has made our sins to be *necessary*, in the order of events. And as we have before presumed, so we will now presume, that it is only in *this*, which is the *true* sense, that Calvinists would represent God as being the author of sin, when they speak of the *divine decrees*, *hereditary depravity*, *personal election*, and *reprobation*, &c. If then we are asked, what objections we have against them; we answer, In the first place, their terms do not accurately express what we suppose them intended to express. They are popular words, and have a popular signification, which cannot be separated from them. When we say, that God foreordains and decrees the existence of evil, we convey not only the idea that he has occasioned its necessary existence, which perhaps is true; but also another idea, which even a Calvinist must acknowledge to be false; namely, that he occasions the existence of evil in and for itself—with a design and desire that it might exist, even if nothing else existed. This distinction must be insisted on. A legislator frames a system of government, which he foresees will occasion some evils; yet as he perceives that, upon the whole, the system will promote the good of those concerned, he puts it into operation. Now it is plainly an abuse of language to say, that he *decrees* the existence of those

evils which his system only occasions, and which he foresees it must occasion, though he would gladly avoid them, could he do it and still retain his system. Yet it is the same abuse of language to say, that God decrees the existence of that evil which he foresees will arise in this system of things. There are bad moral associations connected with such modes of speaking, and therefore they ought to be abandoned, as not exactly corresponding to the truth of things.

In the second place, we object to the language of Calvinists on this subject, because it is such as cannot fail of being grossly misunderstood by many to whom they address themselves. It is true that they may explain and limit and qualify their terms so that *to them* they shall stand for no more than what may be admitted. But it is morally impossible to make the great mass of readers and hearers understand these explanations, and limitations, and qualifications. They hear it broadly and positively asserted that God ordains and absolutely decrees the existence of evil; and they do and they will understand by this, that he ordains and absolutely decrees the existence of evil in the same general sense in which he does the existence of good; and you cannot prevent it. You may say it is their own fault, since you do what you can to save them from such a misapprehension of your meaning. But this will not do. Notwithstanding all you can say to explain and limit and qualify such language, you must know that the multitude will still misapprehend it; and as it is one of the best settled principles of morals, that the promiser shall fulfil his promise in the sense in which he has reason to suppose the promisee understands him; so likewise, on the same principle and for the same reason, he who undertakes to teach others is bound to use such language as shall not only be true in some one sense, but also in that sense in which he has reason to believe those to whom he addresses himself will understand him.

We object thirdly to the language of Calvinists, because we think it tends to introduce great confusion and apparent inconsistency into their thoughts and writings on this subject. Mr. Hume somewhere observes, that when he left his study and mingled with the world, he always thought and acted like other people—all the principles of his sceptical theory to the contrary notwithstanding. Something like this seems to be true of the Calvinists. While actually insisting on the technical part of their theology, they appear to differ very much from the rest of the world; but as soon as they quit the formal consideration of their peculiarities, they seem to forget or disregard them; and in the intercourse of life to think and act upon principles very unlike those they avow—upon principles in

short, that are precisely and identically the same with ours. It has been often and truly said, that every Calvinist is an Arminian, at least one half of the day : and those who are accustomed to hear Calvinistic preaching, know very well, that the preacher contrives, in almost every discourse, to contradict in the application, all that he has advanced in the doctrinal part. After having proved beyond controversy that men can do nothing at all for themselves, since every thing is fixed and absolutely decreed by God—they suddenly turn round upon their people, and tell them in language of direful threatening, that they must do a great deal, and that too quickly, or perish everlastingly. Now even were we to suppose that this inconsistency is confined to the *language* alone and extends no farther, still that mode of speaking and writing must surely be allowed to be a bad one, which thus carries on the face of itself contradiction. But we apprehend that it does and must extend further ; that the confusion and inconsistency of the language arise from that of the *thoughts* ; for we all know, or ought to know, that clearness and accuracy of thought go very much together with clearness and accuracy of language. If therefore we wish, in our popular discourses, to convince people that they really can do nothing at all for themselves, since every thing is fixed and decreed by God—we had better carry the same language through ; we had better do as the Antinomians do, and apply the doctrine, terrible as it may be, to the conduct and the life. For if we make our language self-contradictory, by mixing together technical and popular phraseology, using the same terms now in one sense and now in another ; we shall most assuredly confuse and confound, not only the thoughts of those whom we address, but also our own. And no occasional explanation of terms will be sufficient to prevent it. The bad effects of this mode of writing are strikingly exemplified in Mr. Locke's use of the word *idea*, in his Essay on the Human understanding.

There is one more objection, which, in our opinion, has not received the attention which it deserves. We have room for only a brief statement. Calvinists, as we have before remarked, mix together their technical terms and the popular language ; now we say, that from this composition of two different languages, they infer doctrines that are not true, understood in the sense of either language. We must illustrate our meaning. *Perhaps* we might not be very unwilling to admit that all human actions, if you trace back the whole history and concatenation of motives, are *philosophically* or *technically* speaking, necessary. We are also ready to allow, that in a *popular* sense, there can be no virtue except in doing what we might,

if we pleased, avoid doing. But we would by no means, admit that our actions are necessary, in a *popular* sense; because no one can pretend that the control, which motives may exercise over our wills, is of a *compulsive* kind: our actions are still *morally* free—free in the popular acceptance of the term free-agency. Nor on the other hand, could we by any means allow, that in *philosophical* language, there can be no virtue in obeying necessity—for virtue in philosophical language, if it mean any thing at all, must mean simply a moral fitness in actions—and this surely may be where there is *philosophical* necessity. Those, however, of whom we speak, pay no regard to these very important distinctions; but confound philosophical expressions with popular. In this way a syllogism is formed something like this.

Whatever men do they cannot help doing;

There can be no virtue in doing what they cannot help doing;

Therefore there can be no virtue in men's doings.

Hence the necessity of supernatural gifts; of imputed righteousness; and hence too the doctrine of total depravity.

We verily believe that it is to this confounding together technical language with popular, and so reasoning from one to the other as if they were the same, that most of the existing absurdities on these subjects may be traced.

Our readers may complain, and perhaps justly, that we have given them too much of our own speculations and not enough of the sermon we undertook to review. Our reasons for proceeding as we have done, have however been stated before. It will readily be seen that we fully concur with the writer of this discourse in maintaining that God is not the author of sin in any sense, which would imply that he has produced it by design or occasioned it in and for itself; but on the contrary that he has done every thing he could, consistently with his perfections and the constitution of things in this world, to prevent sin. With the writer of this discourse, we also perfectly agree in rejecting the doctrine of hereditary depravity, as making God the author of sin, in a sense which must not for a moment be admitted.

"This objection is evaded by saying that our corrupt nature is not from God, but conveyed to us from Adam in the ordinary course of generation. This evasion does not remove the difficulty in the least. Suppose that moral character could be conveyed by ordinary generation from parent to child (which however is a thing impossible) yet who has established the connexion between causes and effects, but he, who is the great cause of all things but sin? By whose appointment is it that the child shall, as an effect of being born of its parents, inherit all its parents' moral as well as

physical qualities? It is not God's? If so, he is as truly the author of the nature, which we have at our birth, upon this supposition as upon the other. If total depravity be a part of that nature, he, according to the theory under consideration, must be the author of it." pp. 12, 13.

We highly approve of the manner in which the writer of this discourse speaks of the unprofitable and even injurious tendency of introducing polemic theology into the pulpit. But when we consider that the doctrine of an hereditary depravity, "a total moral corruption, with which every person is born into the world, and on account of which every person at his birth is wholly depraved in the sight of God, indisposed to all good and disposed to all evil," has been adopted, and is still maintained by many, as a doctrine of divine truth—and regarded as indeed it is, as the very key stone of their system; when too we consider with Mr. Bartlett, that this doctrine is not only expressly contradicted by particular passages, but by the whole tenor and scope of the word of God;—"that it shockingly impugns the holiness, justice, goodness and veracity of God;"—that it confounds all our moral distinctions, and destroys all grounds of preference, of approbation, of blame;—that it is

"Formed to depreciate, not to humble man;"

since it tends not in the smallest degree to make men modest and diffident, but only to break down every thing that is generous and honourable in the human character; when we consider all this, we cannot but say, that we think it to be not only the right but the solemn duty of every preacher of the gospel to raise his voice against this infatuation. May it always be done with that clearness, conclusiveness and candour which characterize the performance before us.

"Although dissent from the doctrine of hereditary, total depravity is often very *conveniently* ascribed to an unconverted, spiritually blinded, natural state; to the enmity of the natural heart against divine truth; yet whether it be so or not is known to him only, whose sole prerogative it is to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart, and to determine its spiritual state. To him would we humbly appeal." p. 13.

From intimations incidentally dropped by the writer of this discourse, we conclude that some difference of opinion on this subject exists among the people of his charge. We earnestly pray that it may not lead to discord and disunion—the plague and curse of our churches. This full and ingenuous statement of his sentiments cannot fail, we think, to multiply and confirm his friends, and at the same time either to satisfy those who

may have been otherwise minded, or destroy their influence. We trust that God in his providence will spare him the pain of seeing those, over whom the Holy Ghost has made him an overseer, shut their hearts against his love, and refuse to be benefited by his friendly ministrations. Should it not be so, then indeed it will furnish us with another melancholy evidence of the pernicious influence, which a belief in the doctrines we have been opposing is calculated to exert on the human character, and especially on the social and kind affections of the heart.

ARTICLE XII.

Letters to the Rev. Wm. E. Channing, containing Remarks on his Sermon, recently preached and published at Baltimore. By MOSES STUART, Associate Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover. Second Edition, corrected and enlarged. Andover: Flag and Gould, 1819. pp. 180.

WE have no intention of giving a complete review of Professor Stuart's Letters at present. Before doing this, we thought it proper to wait for the appearance of the second edition, which was announced; but this having but just been published, we have since had no opportunity to remark at length upon its contents. We reserve to ourselves the privilege of resuming the subject in a future number. But if the controversy should continue, we think there are some important preliminary points which ought to be settled, and on which further explanation may be reasonably expected from Professor Stuart. We take the present opportunity of stating them, for the purpose of calling his attention to the subject.

I. Professor Stuart charges Mr. Channing with misrepresenting the opinions of the orthodox.

"The statement which you exhibit of our views is VERY FAR from that which we, (or at least, all Trinitarians with whom I am acquainted,) make of our belief." p. 17.

"I refuse assent to your statement of our belief." p. 18.

—"you have awakened in all those who differ from you a deep sensation——of misrepresentation of their views." p. 178.

These general charges ought not to have been made without being supported by distinct specifications. In what particulars, we ask, has Mr. Channing misrepresented the doctrines of

Trinitarians and Calvinists? After the accusations which Professor Stuart has brought, we have a right to expect from him a precise answer to this question; and we will state of what character we conceive this answer ought to be. The words of Mr. Channing's Sermon should be quoted, and compared with the authorized formularies of doctrine, adopted by orthodox sects and churches,—with their creeds, confessions, and articles; and with the works of those who are acknowledged by them as standard writers. We shall then perceive, whether any such discrepancy exists, as has been alleged.

Professor Stuart has undertaken to give some new views of the doctrines which he defends; and though we think the remarks of Mr. Channing as applicable to these, as to the statements commonly received; yet the former gentleman must perceive, that the question is not, whether Mr. Channing has given a fair account of the private opinions of Professor Stuart, or of those of his friends with whom he may have conversed on the subject; but whether Mr. Channing has given a fair account of orthodox doctrines, as publicly professed and inculcated by different sects and churches.

In the answer which we expect, we think it right to guard likewise against the introduction of any remarks, similar to some of those which Professor Stuart has already made. He accuses Mr. Channing of implicitly affirming that Trinitarians 'deny the divine unity.*' Every one understands, that all Unitarians regard the proper doctrine of the Trinity, as utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of the divine unity; but no Unitarian, we imagine, ever charged his opponents with denying, or even not professing to believe the divine unity; and it was therefore unnecessary for Professor Stuart to quote eight or nine different confessions, to establish the uncontroverted fact, that all Trinitarians do so profess to believe. To prove, or to endeavour to prove, that one doctrine held by a sect is inconsistent with another doctrine held by the same sect, is a very different thing from affirming, that one or the other of these doctrines is denied by that sect. Putting out of view every other consideration, except the *notoriety of the fact*, that ALL Christians profess to believe the divine unity, we think, if Professor Stuart will reconsider the subject, he will hardly be willing again to state or imply, that Mr. Channing meant to insinuate that this doctrine is denied by Trinitarians.

The charge of misrepresentation, then, is one point which we wish to have explained; and on which we think we have a right to expect further explanation.

* Page 21. See also what precedes.

Connected with the one mentioned, there are some other charges against Mr. Channing, which we regard as having had their origin in a misconception of the necessary character of those statements, which the object of his discourse required that gentleman to make. Mr. Channing writes against *doctrines*, not *persons*; but Professor Stuart confounds, (we wish they had not been too often confounded before,) an attack upon opinions with an attack upon the persons of those who hold them; and implies in consequence, that Mr. Channing has *intentionally injured the feelings of his opponents*; that he has treated them with "contumely;" that he has made it an object "to hold them up in such an attitude as to excite disgust or scorn or derision;" that he has "striven to degrade and render them contemptible," and that a review of what he has written will give him more acute sensations, than any thing Professor Stuart could say on the subject.* The distinction which we have just stated, appears to us a very obvious one; but as it does not seem to be clearly understood by Professor Stuart, we will illustrate it by an example. We believe, and we have a right to say we believe, that the doctrine of the Trinity contradicts the plainest declarations, and the whole tenor of the Scriptures; that in itself, it involves propositions as clearly contradictory to each other as any which can be stated; as clearly self-contradictory as if we were to say, that some being did not exist till yesterday and did exist from eternity; that the connexion of this doctrine with Christianity has been productive of the most serious evils; and that it has been a scandal to our faith, rendering it to appearance wholly unreasonable. All this, and much more, it would be no breach of Christian charity, or of decorum, to say with regard to the doctrine. But it is the use of similar language in Mr. Channing's sermon, on which we conceive Professor Stuart must found his complaints. As it respects those who hold this doctrine, and the other doctrines of orthodoxy, Mr. Channing speaks with no asperity, but with the temper of a Christian, and with the liberality of a man of enlarged views, who perceives that the character of an individual may be affected by many other circumstances, and some of them perhaps much more important ones, than the errors of the sect to which he may happen to belong. But if Mr. Channing had said or insinuated, that those who hold the doctrine in question, treat the Scriptures with contempt; that against the conviction of their understandings, they refuse to submit to their plain language; but in opposition to this, teach absurdities as articles of faith; if he had said that they were

* See pp. 178 and 149.

concealed enemies to Christianity, hypocrites, having their consciences seared with a hot iron ; or even if he had insinuated that the younger part of their clergy, not having so much regard for religion as they ought, were travelling fast toward infidelity—we should then have regarded Professor Stuart's complaints as not unreasonable.

We confess that at present these complaints appear to us a little extraordinary, especially when we take some other circumstances into consideration. All Professor Stuart's readers cannot have forgotten the kind of language which has been used, and the modes of attack, which have been adopted for ten or twelve years past, by some of those who may be loudest in their complaints of Mr. Channing's sermon. All of them cannot have forgotten (to take one instance) how long the *Panoplist* has been made a vehicle of such falsehood and scurrility, as we should expect to find only in the vilest newspaper of a profligate political faction. And now, when a gentleman of the highest character has come forward to vindicate the opinions which he holds in common with many others, and has done this with remarkable dignity and forbearance, we think there are some considerations, which ought to have powerfully restrained Professor Stuart from making the remarks he has done.

II. But we proceed to our second topic of inquiry.—In a controversy respecting any doctrine, which is to be established, or disproved, by the words of Scripture, it is of primary importance to settle correct principles of interpretation, or, as Professor Stuart prefers calling it, *exegesis*. Without these, it is worse than useless to attempt to argue from the language of the Bible. But though Professor Stuart has repeatedly adverted to this subject, yet our present impression is, that his notions concerning interpretation are extremely loose and inconsistent ; that he has no settled principles on which he proceeds. We wish therefore that he would give us in his own language, and in precise terms, a general statement of his opinions on the subject ; one similar to that given by Mr. Channing. There is a short passage, indeed, in which he appears to have attempted to do this ; but which seems to us to have been written with great inconsideration. After observing, that the Scriptures are to be interpreted in the same manner as all other books, he says ;

“From this great and fundamental principle of all interpretation, it results that the grammatical analysis of the words of any passage ; i. e. an investigation of their meaning in general, of their syntactical connexion, of their idiom, of their relation to the context, and of course of their *local* meaning ; must be the essential process, in determining the sense of any text or part of scripture.” p. 52.

The amount of this we conceive to be, that the investigation of the meaning of a passage is the essential process in determining its sense. Certainly : or rather it is the *whole* process. But the point of our question is, how the meaning of a passage is to be investigated ? Professor Stuart proceeds,

"On this fundamental process, depends the interpretation of all the classics, and of all other books ; from this result laws which are uniform, and which cannot be violated, without at once plunging into the dark and boundless field of conjectural exegesis."

We do not perceive how laws or rules can result from a *process* as their foundation. A process is directed by rules already established. The fundamental process here spoken of, it is to be recollected, is an investigation of the meaning of the words of any passage. An *investigation* is not a general principle, from which particular rules may be deduced. He next observes :

"Whatever aid I may get from other sources to throw light upon my text, I cannot dispense with the aid which these rules will afford."

After an investigation of the meaning of a passage, according to those rules by which such an investigation ought to be conducted, we know of no aid which can be obtained from other sources to throw light upon the text. The next sentence is as follows :

"These rules are founded in a simple fact, that every writer wishes and expects to be understood by his cotemporaries, and therefore uses language as they do."

Here instead of the process of interpretation itself, which he had before assigned, Professor Stuart provides a new foundation for his system of 'exegesis,' and what we must consider as rather an inadequate one. The simple fact, that a writer means to be understood by his contemporaries, seems to us a slender foundation, on which to build the whole art of interpretation. The last sentence of the paragraph is this :

"We presume this of the sacred writers ; and apply to them, as to the classics, (excepting that we allow for the Hebrew-Greek idioms in the New Testament,) the common and universal rules of grammatical interpretation."

We do not readily understand why Professor Stuart makes an exception with regard to the Hebrew-Greek idioms, i. e. the Hebraisms of the New Testament ; since but for this ex-

ception, we should suppose, that one established rule of interpretation which he would admit; is, that we must attend to the peculiarities of style and idiom in the writer to be interpreted, and that he would regard this general rule as equally applicable to the classics and to the New Testament.

We have remarked upon this passage, thus particularly, because we think that this alone would go very far to justify the opinion which we have expressed, of the inaccuracy and obscurity of Professor Stuart's notions respecting the principles of interpretation. But to say the truth, this has not been our only motive. We consider it as a fair specimen of the looseness of thought and expression which prevails throughout his letters; and one such specimen, as it happened to fall in our way, we were willing to give in our present notice.

But in answer to our inquiry respecting his principles of interpretation, Professor Stuart may perhaps allege, that he has already given his assent to all that is essential in those maintained by Mr. Channing; and therefore it is not necessary to explain himself further. But to this we reply, that his manner of speaking of the principles advanced by the latter gentleman is one of those circumstances, which convince us that he is far from having any clear notions on the subject. He begins by stating, that these principles are one of the points on which "he feels *compelled to dissent* from Mr. Channing's opinions." After quoting them at length, however, he seems to have found them less objectionable than he had supposed; and proceeds to give his "cheerful and most cordial *assent* to a great part of them;" "he finds *little* from which he should *dissent*;" "if there be any thing to which he should object," it is the "colouring which has been given to some of the language;" and he finally concludes his general remarks concerning this topic, on which he had felt compelled to dissent from Mr. Channing, by claiming for the "divines called *orthodox*" the reputation of having adopted these very principles, "for substance." In his subsequent letters, he repeatedly expresses his agreement with Mr. Channing in all that is most essential in his principles of interpretation. To us however, while reading these letters, it was clear that the agreement was not so great as Professor Stuart supposed; and therefore, though we were a little, we were but a little surprised, when upon coming to his last letter we met with such passages as the following:

"I am well satisfied, that the course of reasoning in which you have embarked, and the principles by which you explain away the divinity of the Saviour, [i. e. the principles of interpretation, on which Mr. Channing explains the texts brought forward by Trinitarians, in support of their doctrine] must lead most men who approve them, eventually to the conclusion,

that the Bible is not of divine origin; and does not oblige us to belief or obedience." p. 160. * * * * *

"For myself, I view it as incomparably more desirable, in almost every point of view, that the authority of the Scripture should at once be cast off; and its claims to divine inspiration rejected; than that such rules of exegesis should be introduced, as make the Scripture speak, *volens volens*, whatever any party may desire. p. 161.

We can conceive no propriety in this remark, unless Professor Stuart considers Mr. Channing's principles of interpretation as being of this character. But the point is settled by the commencement of the next paragraph.

"In making these observations, on the nature and probable consequences of your system of exegesis which explains away the Deity of Christ, I cannot think that I am building castles in the air, to amuse my own imagination. p. 162.

Similar remarks to those already quoted, may be found in the paragraph which commences on the 170th, and ends on the 171st page of the 2d edition. We think we never witnessed so complete a revolution of opinion within the compass of two hundred pages. *The wheel has come full circle.*

But Professor Stuart may perhaps say, that at the commencement of his last letter, he has quoted a new passage from Mr. Channing, which passage, not before quoted, contains a statement of that principle of interpretation which is to effect all the mischief he apprehends; and that he begins his comment upon it by saying, "I must *hesitate*," (the word is thus marked by himself, we should hardly have supposed that he would hesitate about adopting a principle which he regards as so pernicious,) I must *hesitate* to adopt this principle before examining its nature and tendency." The rule of interpretation referred to, as stated by Mr. Channing, (the *only* one contained in the quotation from him in the last letter,) is simply this: "Language is to be explained according to the known properties of the subjects to which it is applied." The rule is finely illustrated by him in the paragraph quoted; and as a general principle, appears to us indisputable. But with regard to the entire inconsistency of Professor Stuart's opinions; it is of more importance to remark, that this rule is involved throughout, and, what is still more, is *expressly stated* in the general account of his principles of interpretation given by Mr. Channing, with which Professor Stuart had declared his agreement in every thing essential. In this general account Mr. Channing says:

"Human language, you well know, admits various interpretations; and every word and every sentence must be modified and explained according to the subject which is discussed, &c.

To this rule Professor Stuart says, p. 26. that he assents with all his heart. Again, Mr. Channing observes :

"With these views of the Bible, we feel it our bounden duty to exercise our reason upon it perpetually, to compare, to infer, to look beyond the letter to the spirit, to *seek in the nature of the subject*, and the aim of the writer, his true meaning; and in general to *make use of what is known for explaining what is difficult, and for discovering new truths.*"

Again : "Who does not see that we must *limit all these passages by the known attributes of God, of Christ, and of human nature, &c.*"

Again : "Enough has been said to shew in what sense we make use of reason in interpreting scripture. From a variety of possible interpretations, *we select that which accords with the nature of the subject*, and the state of the writer, with the connexion of the passage, with the general strain of scripture, *with the known character and will of God, and with the obvious and acknowledged laws of nature.*"

Professor Stuart, after reading our remarks, must, we think, be convinced of the great convenience both to himself and his opponents, of settling his principles of interpretation, before he writes again so much at large upon the subject. When he has done this, we hope he will explain himself further, and state what he regards, as those "fundamental maxims of exegesis," of which he speaks so much in his letters. We suppose he will assent without hesitation to the general truth, that one who has no settled principles of interpretation, is not well qualified to criticise difficult passages in the New Testament.

III. But in the third place, we equally want explanation respecting Professor Stuart's notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, as concerning his principles of interpretation. In his general statement, he denies that there are three persons in the Divinity, in the proper sense of the word, *person*; but maintains that there is a real threefold distinction in the Divinity, of the nature of which distinction he professes to know nothing which can be affirmed positively. By the use of the word, *distinction*, instead of *person*, he regards himself as protecting the doctrine from every attack. All its inconsistencies and self-contradictory statements are to be covered up by this single word. But his arguments are at war with his statements. When he reasons from scripture, he brings NOTHING to establish the threefold distinction above mentioned; but all his arguments, if they prove any thing, prove that Christ is a *divine person*, in the proper sense of the word, *person*. Let us notice his remarks upon the first passage on which he comments, John i. 1—3. The Logos or Word here mentioned, he considers as Christ; and he asks;

"Who or what was this *Logos*? A PERSON; or an attribute of God? A REAL AGENT; or only the wisdom, or reason, or power of God?" p. 59.

And he goes on to prove, that the Logos was a real agent, a person, "diverse from that God with whom he was,"* and yet God,† and still further "most intimately connected with God,"‡ and last of all, "the supreme God."§ Christ, or the Son, then, or the second 'distinction' in the Trinity, which is the Logos, is clearly a person, in the proper sense of the word; whatever else may be thought of Professor Stuart's account.

In his comments on the two next passages which he quotes, Heb. i. 10—12. and Col. i. 15—17. he endeavours to shew that Christ, or the second distinction in the Trinity, is "Jehovah," "the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth;" "THE absolute, supreme, omnipotent and omniscient Being." Of course he must here regard this distinction as a *person*.

And page 93. He gives a new rendering to Phillipians ii. 5—8, for the purpose of making the Apostle say, that Christ (that is, the supreme God) "being in the condition of God, did not regard his equality with God as an object of solicitous desire."—The supreme God did not regard his equality with God as an object of solicitous desire! But the Being by whatever name he may be called, who thus felt respecting this claim of equality, must have been a person.

But what is proved by one passage of scripture, adduced by Professor Stuart, is proved by all, and implied in his comments upon all; viz. that Christ, as the Son, i. e. according to Professor Stuart, as the second distinction in the Trinity, is a person in the proper sense of the word. Does Professor Stuart really believe that it is the doctrine of scripture, that the Son of God is NOT a PERSON? Whether this person be God himself, is a further question.—We have remarked particularly on the few passages above referred to, rather because they seem to us to manifest a singular confusion of ideas in other respects, than because we thought it necessary to quote them, in order to shew the truth of our assertion, that Professor Stuart's own arguments disprove his general statement.

We will compare together two other passages, which may serve still further to make it evident, that we cannot well know with what we are contending in opposing Professor Stuart's doctrine of the Trinity. On page 43, he speaks of

"those Trinitarians, who have expressed themselves on this subject so incautiously, as to be understood to affirm, that there are three separate beings, (persons in the *common* sense of the word,) in the Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c. If there be any now, who defend such a statement of this subject, I must leave them to compose the difficulty with Toellner, as they can."

* p. 61.

† p. 63.

‡ p. 64.

§ 65.

On page 127, addressing Mr. Channing, he says,

"But how can Trinitarians maintain that Jesus Christ is '*the same Being as the Father*,' when a prominent trait of their doctrine is, that there is a *distinction* between him and the Father? You yourself represent them as holding this distinction to be equal to that, which exists between two different men."

If Trinitarians do not maintain that Christ is the same being with the Father, of course they maintain that he is a different being. Do Trinitarians then express themselves incautiously when they say, that there are three separate beings in the Godhead, or do they not? Are there any Trinitarians who now defend this opinion, and is Professor Stuart one of their number; or are there none?

To the passage last quoted, Professor Stuart, perceiving perhaps its inconsistency with what he had before said, has, in his second edition, added the following sentence:

"This indeed, (i. e. Mr. Channing's representation) is incorrect: but it is equally so to represent them as holding that Jesus Christ is '*the same being as the Father*,' if you mean by this, *in all respects the same*."

We cannot think that he has happily extricated himself from the difficulty in which he was involved. It follows from his last statement, that Christ is in some respects the same being with the Father, and in some respects not the same being. In so far as the former proposition is true, Christ and the Father are but different names for the same being, that is for one being; and this one being is then Christ himself. With this one being, however, he is partly the same, and partly not the same. Christ, therefore, according to Professor Stuart's last account, is partly identical with himself, and partly not. We believe this is not *yet* one of the authorized propositions respecting the doctrine of the Trinity; though, indeed, we perceive no reason in the nature of the proposition itself, why it should not be. Christ, says Professor Stuart, is not *in all respects the same* with the Father. There can be no degrees or gradations of identity. We might, indeed, employ the expression, '*in all respects the same*' in popular discourse or writing; but then we should use the word, *same*, only in a loose sense, as synonymous with *similar*. It is obvious that it is not here used in this sense by Professor Stuart.

But there is one passage in which Professor Stuart states his opinions respecting the divinity of Christ, to the doctrine contained in which many Unitarians will find but little to object. It is as follows:

One person, in the sense in which each of us is one, Christ could not be. If you make God the soul, and Jesus of Nazareth the body of Christ; then you take away his human nature, and deny the imperfection of his knowledge. But may not God have been, in a manner altogether peculiar and mysterious, united to Jesus, without displaying at once his whole power in him, or necessarily rendering him supremely perfect? In the act of creation, God does not put forth all his power; nor in preservation; nor in sanctification; nor does he bring all his knowledge into action, when he inspires prophets and apostles. Was it necessary that he should exert it all, when in conjunction with the human nature of Christ? In governing the world, from day to day, God does not surely exhaust his omnipotence, or his wisdom. He employs only so much, as is necessary to accomplish the design which he has in view. In his union with Jesus of Nazareth, the divine *Logos* could not, of course, be necessitated at once to put forth all his energy, or exhibit all his knowledge and wisdom. Just so much of it, and no more, was manifested, as was requisite to constitute the character of an all sufficient, incarnate Mediator and Redeemer. When necessary, power and authority infinitely above human were displayed; when otherwise, the human nature sympathized and suffered, like that of other men." pp. 43, 49.

There is nothing in this explanation of the divinity of Christ, which might not have been written by a Unitarian of the 'straitest sect;' though we suppose that most Unitarians who hold the opinions stated in the paragraph just quoted, might prefer a little different use of language in their expression. The paragraph serves to shew the unsettled state of Professor Stuart's opinions on the subject in question. Let him adhere to the doctrine advanced in it, and make his other notions consistent with this; and he will find that there is little reason for him to engage in controversy with Unitarians.

IV. The next subject on which we wish explanation, is Professor Stuart's statement respecting the ancient doctrine of the Trinity, and the original use of the word, *person*. He says;

"The common language of the Trinitarian Symbols is, '*That there are three PERSONS in the Godhead.*' In your comments upon this, you have all along explained the word *person*, just as though it were a given point, that we use this word here, in its *ordinary* acceptation as applied to *men*. But can you satisfy yourself that this is doing us justice? What fact is plainer from Church History, than that the word *person* was introduced into the creeds of ancient times, merely as a term which would express the disagreement of Christians in general, with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar sentiments, who denied the existence of any *real distinction* in the Godhead, and asserted that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were merely *attributes* of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them, and in which he acted? The Nicene Fathers meant to deny the correctness of this statement, when they used the word *person*. They designed to imply by it, that there was some *real*, not merely *nominal* distinction in the Godhead; and that something more than a diversity of relation or action, in respect to us, was intended. They used the word *person*, because they supposed it approximated nearer to expressing the ex-

istence of a *real distinction*, than any other which they could choose. Most certainly, neither they, nor any intelligent Trinitarian could use this term, in such a latitude as you represent us as doing, and as you attach to it. We profess to use it merely from the poverty of language; merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead, and not to describe independent, conscious beings, possessing *separate* and *equal essences*, and *perfections*. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point?" pp. 21, 22.

Again: "It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they (Trinitarians) were charged with subverting the divine Unity, the meaning of the word *person*, in the ancient records which describe its first introduction into the Symbols of the Church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that 'every word should be modified and explained, according to the *subject* which is discussed, according to the *PURPOSES*, feelings, *circumstances* and principles of the writer.' Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of *person* is forever at an end." p. 23.

We have before remarked, that it is impossible for one, who holds Professor Stuart's opinions, to get rid of the idea of three persons, though he may discard the name. But this is not to our present purpose. Professor Stuart says, that the Nicene Fathers meant to deny the doctrine of Sabellius, when they used the word, *person*. We were not aware that the Nicene Fathers, in declaring what they regarded as the orthodox faith, had any particular reference to the errors of Sabellius; and with regard to the word *person*, they did not use it at all; as Professor Stuart may perceive by reading over their creed, which is to be found in the prayer book of the Episcopal church, not to mention any higher source to which he might recur. In saying that they did not use the word, *person*, we mean of course to assert that they used neither of the two Greek words (*ὑποστάσις* or *πρόσωπον*) which, in relation to this subject, are considered as corresponding to the English word *person*.

But according to Professor Stuart, the Nicene Fathers, or, if he will allow us to make the substitution, the Fathers of the four first centuries, when they affirmed that there were three persons in the Godhead, meant merely to express their disagreement with the reputed errors of the Sabellians; and by no means to convey the sense which would be received, if the word, *person*, were understood in its common acceptation in our own language. Nothing, he says, in Church History, is plainer than this fact. If it be so, it is a fact, which has been generally misunderstood by those who have given the history of the doctrine.

"It is certain," says Whitby, "and is proved at length by the celebrated Cudworth, that the Nicene Fathers themselves,

and many other of the Fathers, did not at all suppose a single or individual unity (of nature in the Trinity) but only a specific unity, common to many, in the same manner as they ascribed the same essence to three different men."

The passage is quoted from the work in which he animadverted upon Bishop Bull's celebrated defence of the Nicene faith, which latter is a standard book among the orthodox Trinitarians of the English church. We mention this, because Whitby goes on to observe, that according to Bishop Bull's own statements, it appears that the "Nicene Fathers regarded the Son as of one substance with the Father, only as Peter and Paul, or a human father and son, are of one substance; that is, the unity of nature was regarded by them not as numerical and single; but only specific."*

That is, the members of the Nicene council regarded the Father and Son as two different persons, or beings, having the same specific (divine) nature; as two different men have the same specific (human) nature; the Son being, as it is expressed in their creed, "God of God." So we have thought; and this, or something very like this, we believe, is the prevailing statement of those who have studied the history of the doctrine in question. But Professor Stuart, who 'peruses the reasonings of Athanasius with great pleasure,'† and of course must be familiar with the whole history of the controversy decided by the council of Nice, may perhaps be able to explain the origin of the common mistake respecting the belief of its members.

Professor Stuart says that the word, *person*, was introduced in opposition to the errors of Sabellius. We beg leave to call his attention to what was actually done in opposition to those of Paul of Samosata, who held similar opinions to those of Sa-

* We give the whole passage from Whitby.

'Est tamen certum, et a *Cl. Cudworthio* multis argumentis demonstratum, Patres ipsos *Nicænos*, aliosque complures, unitatem singularem aut individualement, nequiquam intellexisse, sed tantum specificam, et pluribus communem, eodem plane modo, quo tribus hominibus eandem essentiam tribuebant. Sed nemo certius hoc ipsum demonstrat quam ipse *Præsul Cl. (Bullus)* in longa illa περί του ὁμοουσιου dissertatione, quam Patrum testimoniis præmittit. Nec enim aliter brutorum animæ dici possunt nobis ὁμοουσιου; astra omnia, Sol et Luna ὁμοουσια; angeli et dæmones ὁμοουσιου; bruta denique secundum corpus hominibus ὁμοουσια. Cum igitur ex præmissis hisce exemplis Sectione secunda, tertia sic incipit, hoc ipso sensu *Filium Patri ὁμοουσιου dixisse Nicænos antistites, æquis omnibus et non plane contentiosi ingenii hominibus, ex ipsis Symboli Nicæni verbis manifestum fiet*; ultro fatetur *Præsul Cl.* juxta Symboli Nicæni patres, *Filium cum Patre unam substantiam* haud aliter habuisse quam *Petrum et Paulum*, aut patrem et filium inter homines; hoc est non unitate numerica et singulari, sed tantum specifica.' Whitby, *Disquisitiones Modestæ in Cl. Bulli Defensionem Fidei Nicænæ. Lib. II. Proemium.*

† Page 121.

bellius. The council of Antioch, convened about sixty years before that of Nice, regarding him as having confounded the distinction between the Father and the Son, in order to express their own sense of this distinction, declared that the Son was *not* consubstantial, (*ὁμοουσιος*) or of the same nature with the Father. This was the orthodoxy of the third century, which was opposed to the Sabellian heresy. Afterward the council of Nice declared that the Son *was* consubstantial or of the same nature with the Father; that is, in the sense before explained.

But with regard to the word, *person*, Professor Stuart further observes:

"I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word *person* never had come into the Symbols of the Churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so guarded, as not to lead Christians generally into erroneous ideas of God. Nor can I suppose that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attribute to us as believing. Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and then charge them with the ABSURDITIES consequent upon the *language* of their creed." p. 23.

We suppose that it is to the same subject likewise, that the following general remarks apply, as we can perceive nothing else to which they may have reference:

"I am sensible that allegations are frequently made, that we receive our systems of belief from the Creeds and Confessions of faith, which have descended from former unenlightened, and superstitious or philosophizing ages. That some of our *phraseology* has been derived from men, who *sometimes* speculated too boldly, and substituted names for ideas; I am ready to concede. I feel the embarrassments, that on account of this, are occasionally thrown in the way of inculcating truth, at the present time. Men are very apt to suppose, that if you throw away the old *terms*, or *names*, you reject the old ideas also. Yet it can be only superficial thinkers, who will soberly believe this. It is in general, therefore, a sufficient reason with me for dismissing phraseology, *when it must, almost of necessity, be misunderstood by the great body of men*. Yet, a sudden and entire revolution, in this respect, would be very undesirable; because such a revolution must again lead, at first, to other misapprehensions. I am willing, therefore, to retain many terms, which have become venerable for their antiquity, that I should reject without hesitation, if they were now presented *de novo*." p. 119.

We wish to know how Professor Stuart can be so confident, that language, the use of which it is necessary to guard with a commentary, in order to prevent it from conveying erroneous

ideas ; and which must, without such commentary, be almost necessarily understood in a certain sense, was not meant by those who have employed it, to be understood in this sense. We do not ask for any such license in interpreting the language of scripture, as Professor Stuart has assumed in interpreting the creed of the Institution with which he is connected ; that creed which he has so solemnly professed to believe, and promised to maintain and inculcate. In this it is affirmed ; " that in the Godhead are three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost ; and that these three are one God, the same in substance, EQUAL in power and glory." Power and glory, in the sense here intended, are personal attributes. They are affirmed to belong *equally* to the three subjects mentioned. But *equality* is a term of relation and comparison, and can be affirmed only of *different* subjects. When we say that a thing is *equal*, we must mean, if we have any meaning, that it is equal to some *other* thing. The personal attributes then, which are spoken of in the passage quoted, must be perfectly distinct, and belong to three different persons ; in such a manner that we may compare the power and glory of the one with the power and glory of either of the others, and affirm that the former are equal to the latter. If the creed had declared that their power and glory were *the same*, there might have been some pretence for saying, that it admitted of being explained in a sense conformable to Professor Stuart's statements respecting the doctrine in question. But as it is, no language can express more decidedly the doctrine, that there are three distinct persons in the Godhead, in the proper sense of the word person.

V. We have already extended this article to a far greater length than we intended when we sat down to write. But before concluding it, there is one more topic to which we wish to advert. It is the apprehension, or, as we believe we must call it, the hope, which Professor Stuart expresses of the progress of infidelity in this country, especially among our clergy, and in that form particularly which it has assumed in Germany. This is the subject of the last twenty pages of his pamphlet. We will quote a sentence or two.

"I make no pretensions to uncommon foresight, in regard to this subject. I certainly do not say these things with invidious designs, and for the sake of kindling the fire of contention. Very far from it. On the contrary ; I believe that the parties now contending here, will have no quiet, until this ground be openly taken, on your part. For myself, I view it as INCOMPARABLY MORE DESIRABLE, in almost every point of view, that the authority of the Scripture should at once be cast off ; and its claims to divine inspiration rejected ; than that such rules of exegesis should be introduced, as make the Scripture speak, *nolens volens*, whatever any party may desire." p. 161.

"It needs now, only an acquaintance with German reasoners and critics, (a thing which is fast coming in,) to induce young men to go with them, who set out with your maxim, that 'to believe with Mr. Belsham is no crime.'" p. 169.

"For myself, it is my real conviction, that the sooner matters come to this issue the better." * * * * *

"I shall be ready to confess my apprehensions are quite erroneous, if the lapse of a few years more does not produce the undisguised avowal of the German divinity, in all its latitude. I anticipate this, because I believe that the laws of exegesis, when thoroughly understood, and applied without any party bias, will necessarily lead men to believe, that the apostles inculcated, for substance, those doctrines which are now called *orthodox*. And as there probably will be not a few, who will reject these doctrines, my apprehension is, that to take the German ground will be deemed both ingenuous and expedient." p. 175.

We are sorry to deprive Professor Stuart of his pleasing anticipations of a state of things 'incomparably more desirable' than the present. But we must observe, in the first place, that we are satisfied that he has himself no settled principles of interpretation; and therefore cannot well judge, to what opinions correct principles of interpretation will lead. For ourselves, we are equally satisfied that they will lead to a belief, that what he regards the doctrines of orthodoxy are thoroughly opposed to the whole tenor of scripture; and find no support in any part of it. We believe that if we adopt the same mode of interpretation by which these are deduced from the scriptures, there is no error or absurdity so gross that it may not find support in the sacred writings; and that by the same mode of interpretation, opinions equally irrational may be discovered in the works of any popular writer whom he may chance to take in hand. We shall therefore not be compelled to renounce the scriptures, in order to get rid of the doctrines of orthodoxy. But we will concede so much as this to Professor Stuart; that if we did believe these doctrines to have been taught by Christ and his apostles, we should then think that a most overwhelming weight of external evidence would be necessary to establish the truth of a revelation, which would appear to us to contain so much internal evidence *against* its truth. He will perceive, however, from this remark, that we cannot think a *rejection* of these doctrines likely to be a very efficient cause of infidelity.

But it is to the rejection of these doctrines, that Professor Stuart attributes the infidelity which exists in Germany. We should suppose that one, though even but slightly acquainted with the state of continental Europe for the last century, with the history of opinions, and particularly with the history of German literature, might discover very different causes of sufficient efficacy to produce the phenomenon in question. To

what does Professor Stuart attribute the infidelity which has prevailed throughout other nations on the continent of Europe. When he has determined the causes of this, he will not be at a loss, we think, to account for the origin of German unbelief. We should as little think of attributing the *naturalism* (as it is called) of the German critics and theologians to their rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, as of attributing the infidelity of the philosophers and many of the dignified clergy in France before the revolution, to their rejection of the doctrine of transubstantiation. As it respects that class of modern German theologians to which Professor Stuart particularly refers, we confess that as far as our acquaintance with them extends, we do not regard them with quite so much admiration as he expresses; we do not consider them as such very great men; nor do we think their theories and arguments so plausible and seductive, that much is to be feared from a more general knowledge of their writings.

We shall conclude the present article with a few general remarks upon the character of Professor Stuart's letters. They are written with considerable decorum and propriety. To this however, there are some exceptions, particularly in the last letter. But they are written with very great decorum and propriety, compared with the style of attack which has usually been adopted among us, in opposing the opinions maintained by Mr. Channing. Every one must be struck with the change in this respect; and all the credit to which Professor Stuart is entitled should be willingly allowed him. As a specimen of his talents and learning, we cannot think that these letters do him justice. We are very ready to give him credit for both; and we think we can perceive some causes, which, without calling either in question, may account for the character of his present work. It appears to us to bear marks of having been written very hastily and inconsiderately. Not much advantage seems to have been taken of the opportunity for correction afforded by a second edition; and indeed we think the materials of the first edition such, as not to have admitted of much improvement. He has engaged in the defence of a doctrine, in maintaining which, if any one may appear to much advantage, it must be a very cautious and adroit controversialist, perfectly well acquainted with the ground which he intends to take, and aware of the difficulties with which he will be pressed on every side. Certainly, no one can hope to manage the controversy with much dexterity, who comes to the subject with his own notions respecting it so unsettled and undefined, as those of Professor Stuart appear to us to be. Much of the character of his pamphlet we attribute likewise to the studies in which he

has been engaged, considered in connexion with his system of faith. We can hardly conceive a greater chaos of inconsistent opinions, than we should suppose would exist in the mind of a man pledged to maintain the doctrines of the highest orthodoxy, and at the same time an extravagant admirer of the modern school of German theologians. All, which is most deserving of praise in these writers, seems to us not less irreconcilable with the doctrines held by Professor Stuart, than those speculations which are most obnoxious to censure. What form his opinions will finally assume, we do not pretend to determine. That he will adopt what we should regard as rational views of Christianity, we scarcely venture to hope. The course of his studies does not seem likely to lead to this result.

In our next number we intend resuming the consideration of those topics which are suggested by the subject of the present article; unless indeed Professor Stuart should in the mean time be convinced, as we are, that his letters are not a fair specimen of his talents or learning, and, if he pleases, not so able a defence, as he can give, of the doctrine in question. If he should in any way signify this, so that we can justify ourselves to the public, we shall willingly refrain from any further examination of his pamphlet. If on the other hand, he should undertake to answer any of the inquiries proposed in this article, we shall of course pay all proper attention to his reply.

INTELLIGENCE.

Theological Education in Harvard University.

It is highly gratifying to the friends of our University to mark its progress in the means and facilities of instruction, and the distinguished place it occupies in the public estimation. We notice with much pleasure the establishment of a new Professorship in the important department of Theology, and the accession it has received in the talents and zeal of the gentleman designated to fill it. On Tuesday, August 10, Mr. Andrews Norton was inducted into the Dexter Professorship of Sacred Literature. The foundation was the Lectureship, established at the College by the munificence of Hon. Samuel Dexter, and since erected by the Corporation into a Professorship, retaining the name of its original benefactor. We are happy to state that the Inaugural Discourse, delivered on the occasion, has been given to the public.

On Tuesday, August 24th, the day preceding commencement, 'the Society for promoting Theological Education at Cambridge' held their Annual meeting, when the usual officers were chosen, and the annual report exhibited; the following abstract of which will show the state of its funds and modes of application; and at the same time, we hope, will draw the patronage of the public to its wants.

The Directors report, "that the amount, advanced during the past year for the assistance of Theological Students, derived from annual subscriptions, &c. is \$467.

"That a new Professorship in the department of Theology has been established at the University; towards the support of which the Trustees appropriated seven hundred and forty dollars annually, from the income of the permanent fund; that four hundred dollars from the same income are applied to the assistance of Students; and that the capital subject to the disposal of the Trustees, is \$32195,51.

"The number of Candidates and Students in Divinity at the College, at the beginning of the present College year, was forty-four: eight of whom within that period have been settled in the ministry; one in Baltimore, and one in Mississippi; the others in the Commonwealth: two are under calls at a distance; one in Charleston, S. C.; the other in the Episcopal Church in New-York State: one has been obliged to leave preaching on account of ill health; one has been taken from his studies and prospects here by untimely death; and six are candidate preachers.

"The number, who have been subjects of the aid of the University, in order to their support and encouragement in their studies, is about twenty; to whose assistance about three thousand dollars have been applied; of which \$867,20 have accrued from the funds provided by the Society."

And the Directors conclude by stating, "that if any additional sums can be obtained by the Society for the object proposed, they will serve to supply pressing demands of the Theological Seminary."

The annual discourse was delivered, at the Church in Federal Street, on the evening of the Lord's day preceding Commencement, by the Rev. William E. Channing; from 1 Cor. xii. 28. "God hath set some in the Church; first, apostles; secondarily, prophets; thirdly, teachers."

It had been our intention to have connected with this general notice, some remarks on the importance of our Theological Institution, and its strong claims on the patronage of the Christian community. But we are in great hopes, that the discourse, to which we have referred, will be given to the public; and

will excite the attention, which the sacredness of the subject, and the ability and earnestness with which it is exhibited, may justly demand.

Religious Tracts.—At a late meeting of the Society for conducting the Christian Disciple, it was determined to commence immediately the publication of religious Tracts, in a cheap form, for distribution. The preliminary arrangements have been made, and the publication of some tracts effected; more will soon follow, and we respectfully solicit the aid and co-operation of our friends and the public in the promotion of this object.

The Tracts intended to be published will be both doctrinal and practical, original and selected; and in their general character, will correspond with that of the Christian Disciple and Theological Review. The necessity and utility of such a design must be obvious. Many persons accustomed to distribute Tracts have complained of the difficulty of procuring precisely such as they were willing to circulate. They could find abundance,—but not all unexceptionable; some inculcate the very errors in doctrine they wish to discourage, and some a spirit of practical religion which they cannot altogether approve. It is designed by the present plan to give such persons the opportunity of obtaining what they can conscientiously recommend, and may circulate in the hope of promoting true religion. In order to accomplish this however, in the degree which is desirable, considerable funds will be necessary. We trust that those who are sensible of the importance of the object will be forward in lending it a generous aid. The cause of what they regard liberal and uncorrupt Christianity demands it; and their reward shall be, not only the hearty thanks of those whom they assist, but, what is vastly more, the satisfaction of seeing that they have helped to carry forward the progress of truth and holiness.

Every subscriber will be entitled to receive Tracts, to the full amount of his subscription, at the shop of our publishers; of whom any information on the subject may be obtained.

Already published, Mr. Channing's Sermon at Baltimore; and 'Henry Goodwin, or, the Contented Man.' In a few days will be ready also, the Essay on 'the Holy Spirit,' which appears in this number of the Disciple.

INSTALLATION.

On Wednesday the 25th of July, the Rev. WM. FROTHINGHAM was installed pastor of the Congregational Society in Belfast, Maine. Rev. Mr.

Lowell, of Boston, made the introductory prayer, and read the result of Council. Rev. Dr. Ripley, of Concord, preached. Rev. Mr. Mason, of Castine, prayed after Sermon. Rev. Dr. Allyn, of Duxbury, gave the charge, and read a select portion of Scripture. Rev. Dr. Packard, of Wiscasset, made an address to the people. Rev. Mr. Warren, of Jackson, presented the right hand of fellowship, and Dr. Ripley offered the concluding prayer.

The circumstances connected with the call of Mr. Frothingham, by the people of Belfast, are interesting, and deserve to be recorded.

They had been for several years destitute of a regular ministry, had become divided in their sentiments and feelings, and, in general, indifferent in respect to the means of religious improvement for themselves, and of instruction for their children. As sheep without a shepherd, they were scattered abroad, were exposed to become a prey to imposters and enthusiasts, and had no prospect of a reunion in the participation of religious ordinances.

Belfast, in 1810, contained nearly 1300 inhabitants, and yet not a sufficient number could be found to unite in defraying the expence of a candidate for a limited time.

In this state of things, application was made to the Evangelical Missionary Society, and was not disregarded. Mr. Frothingham was sent to them as a religious instructor, and the teacher of their children and youth. The result was, an entire unanimity, with only one exception, in a call of the Missionary to be their stated pastor, the erection of a large and handsome meeting-house, and the settlement of Mr. Frothingham with the promise of a liberal support, and the prospect of great and increasing usefulness.

Thus, the walls of Zion which were broken down, have been rebuilt, and the flock which had been scattered, and had followed the voice of strangers, has been again gathered into the fold, having its own shepherd.

On this occasion, the house was crowded, and they whose privilege it was to witness the solemnities of installation, can never forget the christian joy that was manifested; nor they who aided in the re-establishment of the ministry here, the feelings of gratitude that were expressed for the enjoyment of so great a blessing.

We shall be happy if the recital of these circumstances, which exhibit in so fair a point of view the judicious and useful exertions of the Evangelical Missionary Society, shall excite a deeper interest in that society; which, notwithstanding its limited means, has already been instrumental of much good, and if aided by the alms and the prayers of Christians, might be productive of far greater and more extended benefits.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

The communication which came through the Post-Office was received too late for insertion in this number, and remains to be examined. As, however, an article on the same subject had already been prepared, we know not whether we shall be able to use it; at least at present.

Correspondents are requested to observe, that communications, not noticed in the number after they are received, will not be published.

☞ Our readers will perceive, that we have again given them eight pages extra; which will in part account for and excuse the delay of a few days in the time of publication.